## Facts

- A 19-year-old employee (“Jane”) worked as a draftsperson for Craig DiPetrillo at his North Providence business.
- On March 20, 2002, DiPetrillo asked Jane to work late in the office basement area; they obtained food and beer, returned, and consumed alcohol.
- Jane testified DiPetrillo pulled her onto his lap and kissed her; she initially responded but then told him they could not do that.
- Jane testified DiPetrillo continued kissing her, touched her breast under her shirt despite her resistance, pulled down her pants and underwear, and digitally penetrated her while she protested and told him to stop.
- DiPetrillo maintained the encounter was consensual.
- After a jury-waived trial, the Superior Court found DiPetrillo guilty of first-degree sexual assault (digital penetration) and second-degree sexual assault (breast contact), offenses requiring proof that the act was accomplished by “force or coercion.”
- DiPetrillo moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence concerning Jane’s post-incident conduct; the trial justice denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing.
- DiPetrillo appealed, challenging (1) the trial justice’s “force or coercion” analysis and (2) the denial of a new trial.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial justice misapplied the statutory “force or coercion” element by treating a private employer-employee relationship as an implied threat of force and by relying on an implied-threat rationale drawn from a case involving a uniformed police officer.
2. Whether the trial justice abused discretion or committed legal error by denying a new trial based on newly discovered evidence about the complainant’s post-incident behavior.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further findings and entry of a new judgment.
- The Court held the trial justice applied an incorrect implied-threat standard by extending a police-authority-based implied-threat rationale to an employment relationship.
- Because the trial court’s reasoning blended the erroneous implied-threat analysis with findings suggesting actual physical force, the Court could not determine whether the convictions rested on legally sufficient physical-force findings alone.
- The Court remanded for additional findings, on the existing record, addressing whether guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt based solely on physical force.
- The Court affirmed the denial of the motion for a new trial because the newly discovered evidence was largely impeaching and collateral and was not likely to change the outcome.

## Legal Principles

- Where sexual assault statutes require proof that sexual contact or penetration was accomplished by “force or coercion,” an implied threat of force cannot be inferred merely from a private workplace authority relationship.
- Implied-threat analysis grounded in the coercive power of state authority (e.g., an armed, uniformed police officer) does not automatically transfer to other authority relationships without evidence of an implied threat of physical force or violence.
- A conviction must rest on a correct legal theory; when a bench trial decision intertwines correct and incorrect standards, an appellate court may vacate in part and remand for clarified findings on the existing record.
- Newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial only if it meets the established requirements, including that it is not merely impeaching or collateral and would probably change the result; denial is reviewed with deference to the trial justice’s credibility assessments.

## Conclusion

The court rejected treating an employer-employee relationship, by itself, as an implied threat satisfying “force or coercion,” affirmed denial of a new trial based on largely impeaching new evidence, and remanded for explicit findings on whether the convictions could be sustained solely on actual physical force beyond a reasonable doubt.


State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124 (R.I. 2007)