## Facts

- Mark A. Etzweiler owned a car and traveled to work with Ralph Bailey on July 30, 1982.
- The State alleged Bailey had been drinking, was intoxicated, and that Etzweiler knew it.
- At the workplace, Etzweiler lent his car to Bailey and went to work; Etzweiler did not accompany Bailey.
- Bailey drove Etzweiler’s car alone, allegedly in a reckless and intoxicated manner, collided with another vehicle, and killed two occupants.
- A grand jury indicted Bailey for manslaughter.
- A grand jury indicted Etzweiler for two counts of negligent homicide and two counts of negligent homicide as an accomplice.
- On stipulated facts, Etzweiler moved to quash the indictments; the trial court reserved and transferred the controlling legal questions to the New Hampshire Supreme Court without ruling.

## Issues

1. Whether lending a vehicle to a person the lender allegedly knows is intoxicated, when the lender is not present at the later collision, can satisfy New Hampshire’s negligent homicide statute.
2. Whether a defendant can be liable as an accomplice to negligent homicide based on purposeful assistance (lending the car) to another’s alleged negligent homicide.
3. Whether recognizing criminal liability for this remote lending conduct is an interpretive application of existing statutes or a policy choice requiring legislative action.

## Decision

- The court answered the transferred questions against the State and concluded the indictments could not proceed on the theories advanced.
- The court declined to impose principal liability for negligent homicide on a defendant whose only conduct was lending the car and who was absent from the fatal driving.
- The court rejected accomplice liability for negligent homicide in this setting, citing the mismatch between accomplice purpose and an offense defined by negligence.
- The rulings effectively sustained Etzweiler’s motions to quash.

## Legal Principles

- Criminal statutes are not to be expanded beyond clear legislative authorization, particularly where the proposed liability would have broad social consequences.
- Negligent homicide requires proof that the defendant negligently caused death—i.e., failed to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, in a manner constituting a gross deviation from reasonable conduct.
- Traditional culpability limits informed the analysis: when the alleged aider is not present during the fatal conduct, imposing homicide liability based solely on prior assistance is not assumed absent clear statutory direction.
- Accomplice liability requires acting with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; this requirement does not readily combine with an underlying offense defined by negligent unawareness.
- Absent explicit legislative direction, courts will not treat lending a car to an allegedly intoxicated person, without presence at the driving, as sufficient for negligent homicide or accomplice-to-negligent-homicide liability.

## Conclusion

The New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to extend negligent homicide or accomplice liability to a car owner who allegedly knew the borrower was intoxicated but merely lent the vehicle and was not present when the borrower later caused fatal collisions, leaving any such expansion of criminal liability to the legislature.


State v. Etzweiler, 125 N.H. 57, 480 A.2d 870 (N.H. 1984)