## Facts

- Joe Govan moved into a home with Sharon Keeble and Keeble’s teenage daughter, and the couple’s relationship was marked by frequent, volatile arguments.
- During one argument, Keeble accused Govan of molesting her daughter and fired a handgun at him but missed.
- After the shot missed, Govan left the home, then returned with a different handgun.
- As Keeble attempted to call the police, Govan shot Keeble in the neck, paralyzing her from the neck down (quadriplegia).
- Govan claimed he did not intend to shoot Keeble.
- While Keeble was hospitalized, Govan and Keeble reconciled and later married.
- Keeble lived for several years as a quadriplegic and suffered severe, ongoing pain and related medical problems.
- About five years after the shooting, Keeble became ill with pneumonia but did not seek medical treatment for about two weeks despite knowing she was sick.
- Keeble ultimately died from pneumonia.
- After Keeble’s death, Govan was indicted for second-degree murder; at trial, two physicians testified that the pneumonia resulted from complications of quadriplegia, which resulted from the gunshot wound.
- The jury convicted Govan of manslaughter as a lesser-included offense; Govan moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient proof of causation, and the trial court denied the motion.
- On appeal, Govan argued (among other claims) that Keeble’s failure to obtain treatment and her alleged decision to “give up her will to live” broke the chain of causation.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by correcting an erroneous self-defense instruction during deliberations and allowing the jury to continue deliberating rather than declaring a mistrial.
2. Whether it was error to instruct on manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Govan’s gunshot proximately caused Keeble’s death, or whether Keeble’s conduct (including delayed treatment and alleged loss of will to live) was a superseding cause requiring acquittal.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed Govan’s manslaughter conviction and sentence.
- The trial court’s correction of the self-defense instruction before the verdict was finalized, followed by renewed deliberations, did not warrant reversal absent a showing of prejudice.
- A manslaughter instruction was properly given as a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder because the evidence allowed the jury to find that Govan acted recklessly rather than with the mental state required for murder.
- Substantial evidence supported causation: medical testimony linked the gunshot wound to quadriplegia and the quadriplegia to pneumonia and death, and Keeble’s delayed treatment and psychological state did not break the causal chain.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant may be criminally responsible for homicide when the defendant’s wrongful act is a proximate cause of the victim’s death, even if death occurs years after the initial injury due to complications flowing from that injury.
- An intervening event relieves a defendant of liability only if it is both independent of the defendant’s conduct and unforeseeable enough to be treated as a superseding cause.
- A victim’s failure or delay in seeking medical care generally does not sever causation when the defendant’s act created the condition that made the victim vulnerable to the fatal outcome.
- When evidence supports a finding of recklessness, manslaughter may be submitted to the jury as a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.
- On a motion for judgment of acquittal, the question is whether substantial evidence exists from which a rational juror could find each element, including causation, beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed Govan’s manslaughter conviction because the jury had substantial medical evidence that the gunshot caused Keeble’s quadriplegia and that the quadriplegia led to fatal pneumonia, and because Keeble’s delayed treatment and alleged loss of will to live were not independent, unforeseeable events that would cut off proximate causation.


State v. Govan, 744 P.2d 712 (1987)