## Facts

- Police received information that the El Maya Restaurant in Phoenix would be robbed on October 22, 1967, and set a stakeout with five officers in and around the parking lot.
- Near closing, an officer entered the restaurant, then exited carrying a money bag toward a white Pontiac in the parking lot.
- A man later identified as Peter Barraza, Jr. followed behind the officer; the officer dropped the bag, identified himself, ordered Barraza to halt, and fired when Barraza appeared to raise his right arm; another officer also fired, and Barraza was hit multiple times.
- Kenneth Wayne Harvill was observed by an officer standing near a tree at the rear of the parking lot and was kept under surveillance for roughly 15–20 minutes before and during the shooting.
- The State’s theory that Harvill participated in the attempted robbery relied largely on circumstantial evidence linking his presence and conduct to the planned offense.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Harvill’s motion for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence.
2. Whether the trial court erred by instructing that the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, instead of instructing that circumstantial evidence must be inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

## Decision

- The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for attempted armed robbery.
- The court held the evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury and upheld denial of a directed verdict.
- The court approved an instruction treating direct and circumstantial evidence as having similar probative value.
- The court held that, when the jury is properly instructed on reasonable doubt, a separate “reasonable hypothesis of innocence” instruction is not required.
- The court overruled prior Arizona decisions to the extent they required a special circumstantial-evidence instruction.

## Legal Principles

- Direct and circumstantial evidence are not categorically different in probative value; either may support proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
- When a proper reasonable-doubt instruction is given, an additional instruction requiring circumstantial evidence to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is unnecessary and may confuse jurors.
- A conviction may rest primarily on circumstantial evidence if, viewed as a whole, it permits a rational finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed Harvill’s conviction and rejected a special circumstantial-evidence instruction requirement, holding that equal-weight treatment of direct and circumstantial evidence is proper so long as the jury is correctly instructed on reasonable doubt.


State v. Harvill, 106 Ariz. 386, 476 P.2d 841 (Ariz. 1970)