## Facts

- In 2013, Kenneth Lawrence Hershey’s neighbor called Sergeant Needham to report that Hershey’s cattle were starving.
- Needham drove to Hershey’s property to investigate but could not see the cattle from the public highway.
- Needham called Hershey, who said he was away and had hired a man to care for the cattle.
- The next day, Sheriff Glerup received another call from the neighbor stating that the cattle were near death and reported that call to Needham.
- Needham contacted another neighbor, who confirmed that the cattle were starving.
- Needham contacted the man Hershey claimed to have hired; the man said Hershey had not hired him.
- Based on the repeated, escalating reports and the apparent lack of a caretaker, Needham and Glerup concluded the cattle would suffer serious injury or death without immediate help.
- Without obtaining a warrant, the officers entered Hershey’s property and determined that the cattle were starving and near death.
- The State charged Hershey with animal neglect, and Hershey moved to suppress the officers’ observations, arguing the warrantless entry violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.
- Hershey conceded that an emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement existed and could apply to animals, but argued the state had not shown an actual emergency because the officers did not enter immediately after the first call and could have waited to obtain a warrant.
- The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Hershey was convicted of first-degree animal neglect.
- Hershey appealed the denial of his suppression motion.

## Issues

1. Whether the emergency-aid exception under Article I, section 9, justified the officers’ warrantless entry onto Hershey’s property to check on reported starving, near-death cattle, despite the earlier decision not to enter after the first report and the possibility of obtaining a warrant.

## Decision

- The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed.
- The court held that the emergency-aid exception applied because the officers had specific, articulable facts supporting an objectively reasonable belief that immediate entry was necessary to prevent serious injury or death to the cattle.
- The court rejected Hershey’s argument that the state failed to prove an emergency because the officers did not enter after the first report and could have waited to pursue a warrant; the relevant question was whether an emergency existed when the officers entered, based on what they reasonably knew at that time.
- The trial court therefore correctly denied the motion to suppress, and Hershey’s conviction was affirmed.

## Legal Principles

- Under Article I, section 9, a warrantless entry may be lawful under the emergency-aid exception when officers can point to specific and articulable facts that support an objectively reasonable belief that immediate action is necessary to prevent serious physical harm or death.
- The emergency-aid doctrine is directed to the need to render aid, not to developing evidence of a crime, and it turns on the circumstances confronting officers at the time they act.
- An emergency-aid rationale can apply to animals when officers reasonably believe the animals face imminent serious harm without prompt assistance.
- The existence of an emergency is evaluated under the totality of the information known to officers, including corroboration from multiple sources and changes in the reported severity of the situation.
- That officers earlier chose investigative steps short of entry, or that a warrant might have been sought, does not by itself defeat emergency aid if, at the time of entry, officers reasonably believed immediate access was needed to prevent serious harm.

## Conclusion

State v. Hershey holds that Oregon’s emergency-aid exception can justify a warrantless entry onto private property to check on animals when officers, based on corroborated and increasingly urgent reports and the absence of a caretaker, reasonably believe immediate entry is needed to prevent serious injury or death.


State v. Hershey, 286 Or. App. 824, 401 P.3d 256 (2017)