## Facts

- West Virginia prosecuted Charles Rhea Hinkle for involuntary manslaughter after his vehicle crossed the center line and collided head-on with another car, killing passenger Charlotte Ann Barrett.
- On June 12, 1993, after finishing his shift at the Ormet Corporation plant in Hannibal, Ohio, Hinkle went to the Village Inn tavern in Paden City, West Virginia.
- At the tavern, Hinkle complained of feeling ill, dizziness, and double vision, and consumed only part of a beer.
- Someone drove Hinkle to retrieve his car. Officers later found multiple beer containers in and around the vehicle, including an open container.
- Testing showed Hinkle’s blood-alcohol level was negligible and far below West Virginia’s statutory definition of intoxication.
- At trial, Hinkle testified that he was unconscious at the time of the collision; two witnesses corroborated his claim.
- A medical witness testified that a previously undiagnosed brain abnormality could have caused a sudden loss of consciousness and that the condition likely would not have been detected before the post-accident MRI.
- Earlier West Virginia decisions had treated pleas of unconsciousness as part of the insanity defense, so Hinkle pleaded insanity at the time of the crash to present his unconsciousness theory.
- The circuit court refused to give a separate instruction explaining unconsciousness/automatism as a defense negating a voluntary act, and instead instructed the jury only that Hinkle suffered from a cognitive disorder.
- The jury convicted Hinkle of involuntary manslaughter; the circuit court denied post-trial motions, and Hinkle appealed based on instructional error.

## Issues

1. Whether unconsciousness (automatism) is a defense separate from insanity that, if supported by reasonable evidence, requires a jury instruction and places on the State the burden to prove a voluntary act beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to properly instruct the jury on unconsciousness/automatism in light of the evidence presented.
3. Whether, even if there is reasonable doubt about the defendant’s consciousness at the time of the crash, the jury may consider whether the defendant’s earlier decision to drive—despite awareness of a recurring condition that can cause loss of consciousness—can constitute recklessness for involuntary manslaughter.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed Hinkle’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held that unconsciousness (automatism) is not part of the insanity defense; it is a separate claim that can negate the voluntariness of the criminal act.
- When the defense introduces reasonable evidence of unconsciousness at the time of the offense, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on unconsciousness.
- Once unconsciousness is raised by reasonable evidence, the State retains the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted voluntarily.
- The trial court’s limited instruction referring only to a cognitive disorder failed to give the jury the legal framework to evaluate voluntariness and the defense theory, requiring a new trial.
- The court also directed that, where supported by the evidence, the jury should be instructed that voluntary operation of a motor vehicle, with awareness of a condition involving recurring loss of consciousness, may amount to reckless disregard for the safety of others—even if the defendant was unconscious at the moment of impact.

## Legal Principles

- A voluntary act is required for criminal liability; unconsciousness/automatism may negate the voluntariness element.
- Unconsciousness (automatism) is separate from insanity because it addresses whether the act occurred voluntarily, not whether the defendant lacked mental responsibility.
- If there is reasonable evidence of unconsciousness at the time of the alleged crime, the court must instruct the jury on the defense.
- After the defense raises reasonable evidence of unconsciousness, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s act was voluntary.
- If a defendant is aware of a preexisting condition involving recurring episodes of loss of consciousness, choosing to operate a motor vehicle despite that risk may constitute reckless behavior.
- Refusal to give a requested instruction is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, but whether the jury was properly instructed is a question of law reviewed de novo.

## Conclusion

State v. Hinkle required a new trial because the jury was not instructed on unconsciousness/automatism as a defense separate from insanity and tied to the State’s burden to prove a voluntary act beyond a reasonable doubt; on retrial, the jury must be instructed both on the unconsciousness defense when supported by reasonable evidence and, where applicable, on the possibility that knowingly driving despite a recurring risk of loss of consciousness can satisfy the recklessness needed for involuntary manslaughter.


State v. Hinkle, 200 W.Va. 280, 489 S.E.2d 257 (1996)