## Facts

- Two minors, Richard V. Hiott and a friend (Jose), engaged in a “very reckless” activity in which they shot BB guns at each other.
- During the activity, Hiott shot Jose in the eye.
- Jose suffered the loss of an eye.
- The State charged Hiott in juvenile court with third-degree assault under RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d), (f).
- The juvenile court found Hiott guilty, stating that neither boy consented to be injured, and that the mutual reckless play resulted in a crime.

## Issues

1. Whether the victim’s consent to participate in a BB-gun shooting “game” is a valid defense to a charge of third-degree assault when serious injury results.
2. Whether any alleged error in the juvenile court’s framing of consent (consent to injury versus consent to the activity) required reversal.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two, affirmed the juvenile adjudication for third-degree assault.
- The court held that consent is not available as a defense where the “game” consists of shooting at another person with a BB gun.
- Because consent was categorically unavailable on these facts, the court did not need to decide whether the juvenile court used the correct formulation of the consent standard.

## Legal Principles

- Consent can be a defense to assault in limited settings recognized by law.
- In the context of sports or similar activities, consent may apply only when the conduct is foreseeable within play, the injury is a by-product of the activity, and the activity is lawful and not forbidden by law.
- Consent is not a defense to assault when the asserted “game” involves shooting at another person with a BB gun, which falls outside lawful, socially accepted activities for which consent can excuse assaultive conduct.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed Hiott’s third-degree assault conviction, holding that a participant’s agreement to a BB-gun shooting “game” cannot supply a consent defense, regardless of whether the trial court focused on consent to injury or consent to the activity.


State v. Hiott, 987 P.2d 135 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)