## Facts

- Christopher Lawrence Jones was charged with raping his 17-year-old niece, K.D., in Benton County, Washington.
- At the first trial, the jury acquitted Jones of first-degree rape but could not reach a verdict on the lesser-included offense of second-degree rape.
- The State amended the information to charge second-degree rape and alleged an aggravating circumstance: Jones used a position of trust to facilitate the crime.
- Before the second trial, Jones sought to testify that the incident occurred during a prolonged, alcohol- and cocaine-fueled group “sex party” in which K.D. consensually had sex with Jones and other men.
- The trial court ruled the proposed testimony and related cross-examination were barred by Washington’s rape-shield statute, treating the evidence as an attack on K.D.’s credibility.
- At the second trial, K.D. testified Jones grabbed her neck, threatened to kill her, and raped her.
- A police officer testified Jones fled to Texas after a warrant issued, denied any sexual contact after extradition, and initially refused a DNA swab until ordered by a judge.
- Jones did not testify at the second trial, and no other alleged participants in the sex party testified.
- The jury convicted Jones of second-degree rape and found the aggravating circumstance.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed (with a remand on an unrelated sentencing issue); the Washington Supreme Court granted review.

## Issues

1. Whether the rape-shield statute was misapplied to exclude evidence of sexual conduct contemporaneous with the alleged rape that was offered to support a consent defense.
2. Whether the exclusion effectively barred Jones from presenting his version of the events, violating the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense (and parallel state protections).
3. Whether any constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Decision

- The Washington Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held the trial court erred by preventing Jones from testifying about the events in question and by improperly applying the rape-shield statute to that testimony.
- The court held the error was constitutional in nature and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Legal Principles

- Rape-shield protections are not absolute and cannot be applied in a manner that infringes a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.
- Evidence describing sexual conduct contemporaneous with, and integral to, the charged act may be admissible when offered as substantive proof supporting the defense theory (e.g., consent), rather than merely to impeach the complainant’s character or credibility.
- Excluding a defendant’s testimony that provides the core account of the alleged incident can violate the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.
- When such an exclusion constitutes constitutional error, the State must prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; otherwise, reversal is required.

## Conclusion

The court ordered a new trial because the rape-shield ruling functionally prevented Jones from presenting a consent-based account of the alleged incident, and the State could not show beyond a reasonable doubt that the exclusion did not affect the verdict.


State v. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d 713, 230 P.3d 576 (Wash. 2010)