## Facts

- Michael Cory Kelso-Christy created a fake Facebook profile impersonating S.P., a person known to the victim, S.G.
- Using the impersonation, Kelso-Christy messaged women and solicited nude photographs and sexual encounters.
- Kelso-Christy contacted S.G., who knew the real S.P., and persuaded her that the fake profile and communications were from S.P.
- After sexually explicit communications, “S.P.” proposed a sexual encounter involving S.G. being blindfolded and restrained with handcuffs; S.G. agreed and invited “S.P.” to her home.
- At the arranged time, S.G. blindfolded herself; Kelso-Christy entered, quickly handcuffed her, and had intercourse without speaking.
- Kelso-Christy left without removing the blindfold or handcuffs; S.G. later freed herself and became suspicious.
- S.G. contacted the real S.P., learned of the impersonation, and reported the incident to law enforcement.
- S.G. repeatedly stated she consented only to sex with S.P. and did not consent to any sexual encounter with Kelso-Christy.
- The State charged second-degree burglary, alleging Kelso-Christy entered S.G.’s home without permission with intent to commit sexual abuse; the intended sexual abuse theory depended on treating identity-based deception as negating consent.

## Issues

1. Whether apparent consent to intercourse obtained by impersonating a known third party constitutes legally valid consent under Iowa sexual-abuse law.
2. If such consent is invalid, whether entry into an occupied structure to engage in intercourse by that impersonation supports the “intent to commit a felony” element of second-degree burglary.

## Decision

- The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the court of appeals.
- The court held that consent procured through fraudulent impersonation of another known person is not valid consent to the sexual encounter.
- Because the planned intercourse would be “sexual abuse” due to lack of valid consent, the evidence supported the burglary element of intent to commit a felony at the time of entry.
- The district court properly denied the motion to dismiss, and the bench-trial verdict and ten-year sentence were upheld.

## Legal Principles

- Consent to sexual activity is partner-specific; agreement to sex with a particular person is not consent to sex with an impersonator.
- Deception about the identity of the sexual partner can negate consent because it concerns the nature of what the person agreed to, not merely a collateral inducement.
- Sexual activity is “against the will” when apparent consent is obtained through deliberate identity impersonation that defeats voluntary agreement.
- For burglary predicated on intent to commit a felony, intent may be established where the defendant enters under a ruse with the purpose of committing sexual activity that would constitute sexual abuse due to invalid consent.

## Conclusion

The Iowa Supreme Court held that impersonating a known person to obtain agreement to intercourse negates legal consent, making the intended act sexual abuse and providing the requisite felonious intent to sustain a second-degree burglary conviction based on entry into the victim’s home for that purpose.


State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 2018)