Facts
- Lawrence “Larry” Kihnel II owned rental property in New Orleans and hired contractor Steven Brock to renovate one building.
- When Brock sought payment, Kihnel proposed an insurance-fraud plan: burn the building and collect insurance proceeds, asking Brock to do it or find someone who would.
- Brock reported the proposal to police and, under direction, continued discussions while pretending to help.
- Kihnel expanded the plan to include burning a second property and killing a tenant he wanted eliminated.
- Police arranged for an undercover officer to pose as an arsonist/hit man; Brock and the undercover officer met with Kihnel.
- In the meeting, the three discussed methods, timing, and price for the arsons and murder; Kihnel made an upfront payment, with the balance to be paid after completion.
- Kihnel arranged to meet the next morning to finalize details, but police arrested him that evening; no arson or homicide occurred.
- After a bench trial, Kihnel was convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated arson and received concurrent sentences.
Issues
- Whether Louisiana’s conspiracy statute requires a genuine agreement between at least two persons with shared criminal intent (a bilateral conspiracy).
- Whether a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy when the only other “participants” are a police informant and an undercover officer who merely feigned agreement.
Decision
- The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit reversed the convictions and vacated the sentences.
- The court held that no conspiracy existed because the only alleged co-conspirators were a police informant and an undercover officer who never intended to commit the crimes.
- The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Legal Principles
- Under La. R.S. 14:26, criminal conspiracy requires (1) an agreement or combination of two or more persons for the specific purpose of committing a crime and (2) an overt act in furtherance of that objective.
- Louisiana follows a bilateral theory of conspiracy: the agreement must be between at least two parties who actually share the requisite criminal intent.
- An agreement element is not satisfied where the other “participants” are government agents (informant or undercover officer) who only pretend to join the plan.
- Conduct showing strong criminal intent and steps toward completion may support other inchoate offenses (e.g., solicitation or attempt if charged), but it cannot substitute for the statutory agreement required for conspiracy.
Conclusion
The court set aside Kihnel’s conspiracy convictions because Louisiana law requires a true agreement between at least two culpable actors, and an informant and undercover officer who feign participation cannot supply the necessary conspiratorial agreement.