## Facts

- Stefan Krol was indicted for murder after stabbing his wife to death in their home.
- At trial, Krol did not dispute the killing; the sole contested issue was his sanity at the time of the offense.
- Psychiatric evidence described an acute schizophrenic condition with delusional beliefs that his wife and employer were conspiring to kill him.
- The jury found Krol not guilty by reason of insanity and further found that his insanity “continued” under the governing statute.
- The trial court ordered Krol committed to a state forensic psychiatric facility “until such time as he may be restored to reason,” a standard previously construed to require a complete cure, not mere symptom remission.
- Krol appealed, arguing the commitment standard violated due process and equal protection; the intermediate appellate court affirmed.
- While the appeal was pending, Krol was conditionally released under substantial restrictions, preserving his challenge to the commitment standard.

## Issues

1. Whether post-acquittal commitment based on “continuing insanity,” without a required finding of current dangerousness, violates due process.
2. Whether applying a more burdensome commitment standard to insanity acquittees than to persons subject to ordinary civil commitment violates equal protection.

## Decision

- The court held unconstitutional the prior construction of the statute to the extent it permitted commitment or continued confinement without proof of current dangerousness.
- The court required that commitment and continued confinement of insanity acquittees rest on findings of both mental illness and a substantial risk of dangerous conduct in the reasonably foreseeable future.
- The court recognized that the proven commission of a dangerous act may be strong evidence in the dangerousness assessment, but cannot replace a current dangerousness determination.
- The matter was remanded for proceedings applying the constitutionally required standard to Krol’s present condition.

## Legal Principles

- Involuntary confinement is permissible only when the nature and duration of commitment bear a reasonable relation to its nonpunitive purposes: treatment and protection of the individual and the public.
- The state may not confine a person solely because of mental illness; due process requires mental illness plus dangerousness attributable to that illness.
- For insanity acquittees, “restoration to reason” cannot be equated with complete cure as a prerequisite for release if current dangerousness is not shown.
- Equal protection permits some procedural differentiation for insanity acquittees based on their proven past dangerous act, but does not permit abandonment of a current dangerousness threshold.

## Conclusion

The court limited confinement of insanity acquittees to cases where mental illness currently creates a substantial, evidence-based risk of dangerous conduct, rejecting indefinite hospitalization grounded only in “continuing insanity” or a demand for complete cure.


State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (N.J. 1975)