## Facts

- Police executed a search warrant at William Andrew Kurtz’s home in 2010 and found marijuana and marijuana plants.
- The State charged Kurtz with manufacturing and possessing marijuana.
- Kurtz sought to present (1) a common-law medical necessity defense supported by medical authorizations and (2) a statutory defense under the Washington State Medical Use of Marijuana Act (MUMA), ch. 69.51A RCW.
- The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine to exclude both defenses, ruling they were not legally available, and did not evaluate whether Kurtz’s evidence satisfied necessity elements.
- A jury convicted Kurtz.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of both defenses and remanded only on an unrelated sentencing issue.
- The Washington Supreme Court granted review on whether MUMA displaced the common-law medical necessity defense.

## Issues

1. Whether MUMA abrogated or superseded Washington’s common-law medical necessity defense to marijuana prosecutions.
2. Whether the trial court erred by categorically denying the common-law necessity defense without determining whether there was evidence sufficient to submit it to the jury.

## Decision

- The Washington Supreme Court reversed on the necessity-defense issue and remanded.
- The court held that MUMA does not abrogate the common-law medical necessity defense, which remains available in marijuana prosecutions.
- The trial court erred by excluding the defense as a matter of law rather than assessing whether Kurtz offered some evidence of each element when viewed most favorably to him.
- On remand, the trial court must recognize the defense’s availability and decide whether Kurtz’s proffer is sufficient to go to the jury under the proper evidentiary standard.

## Legal Principles

- Statutes are presumed not to abrogate common-law doctrines absent a clear legislative expression of intent; abrogation is not inferred by implication when the statute can coexist with the common law.
- The statutory medical marijuana framework provides specified affirmative defenses and immunities for qualifying conduct but is not automatically exclusive of other defenses.
- A defendant may raise the common-law medical necessity defense to marijuana offenses by producing evidence supporting each element, including: (1) a specific and imminent medical harm, (2) conduct reasonably necessary to prevent that harm, (3) no reasonably effective legal alternative, and (4) harms avoided outweigh harms caused by violating the law.
- To decide whether an affirmative defense goes to the jury, the trial court must determine whether there is some evidence supporting each element, viewing the evidence most strongly in the defendant’s favor.

## Conclusion

Washington’s Medical Use of Marijuana Act did not eliminate the common-law medical necessity defense to marijuana crimes, and a trial court may not bar that defense categorically; it must instead decide whether the defendant’s evidence, taken in the defendant’s favor, is sufficient to submit necessity to the jury.


State v. Kurtz, 178 Wash. 2d 466, 309 P.3d 472 (Wash. 2013)