## Facts

- Nancy Lamprey operated a home daycare and transported children from a school bus stop to her house.
- When she drove her pickup truck, children sometimes rode in the truck bed; a parent had previously complained after observing this practice.
- On September 14, 2000, Lamprey picked up six children (three age six and three age ten) at the bus stop; all six climbed into the truck bed without child seats or safety belts.
- While driving to her home, the truck left the roadway and struck a tree; all six children were injured, and one child died.
- The State contended Lamprey caused the crash by performing “swervies” (zigzag steering) to entertain the children; it offered child testimony, tire-mark evidence, and expert testimony that no mechanical defect contributed.
- The defense asserted Lamprey did not recall doing “swervies” and claimed any swerving was to avoid a dog; she also argued a mechanical defect caused unexpected acceleration.
- The State introduced evidence that Lamprey previously performed “swervies” with children riding in the truck bed to show knowledge of risk and to rebut accident or mistake.

## Issues

1. Whether the causation jury instructions, including that a coincidental intervening cause must be the “sole substantial cause” to break the chain of legal causation, correctly stated New Hampshire law and satisfied due process.
2. Whether evidence of prior “swervies” was admissible under N.H. R. Ev. 404(b) for non-propensity purposes and whether its probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.

## Decision

- The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed Lamprey’s convictions for manslaughter, misdemeanor reckless conduct, and four counts of first-degree assault.
- The court held the causation instructions, read as a whole, correctly required proof of both cause-in-fact and legal (proximate) cause.
- The court upheld the “sole substantial cause” instruction because the alleged mechanical defect functioned as a coincidental intervening cause; severance of liability required it to be the sole substantial cause of the result.
- The court held admitting prior-acts evidence of earlier “swervies” was proper under Rule 404(b) to show knowledge of risk and absence of mistake, supported by clear proof, and not unfairly prejudicial.

## Legal Principles

- Criminal causation requires proof both that the result would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct and that the conduct was the legal (proximate) cause of the result.
- Proximate cause is satisfied where the defendant’s conduct is a predominant cause and substantial factor producing the prohibited result, and the result is a direct consequence of the conduct.
- When an alleged intervening cause is coincidental, it severs legal causation only if it is the sole substantial cause of the prohibited result.
- Jury instructions are evaluated in their entirety; no error exists if, taken as a whole, they accurately convey the governing law and do not dilute the State’s burden of proof.
- Under N.H. R. Ev. 404(b), other-acts evidence is admissible if offered for a non-character purpose, supported by clear proof, and if probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed the convictions, concluding that the trial court’s causation charge properly addressed coincidental intervening causes using the “sole substantial cause” standard and that evidence of prior similar driving behavior was admissible for non-propensity purposes under Rule 404(b).


State v. Lamprey, 149 N.H. 364, 821 A.2d 1080 (N.H. 2003)