## Facts

- Lauglin, an enslaved person, was indicted for feloniously, willfully, and maliciously setting fire to and burning a barn containing corn.
- The evidence at trial showed he willfully and maliciously set fire to a stable.
- The fire spread about twenty-six feet to a nearby crib containing corn and peas.
- The crib was partially burned but saved from total destruction by substantial efforts.
- The trial court instructed the jury to convict if the crib’s burning was a reasonably probable result of burning the stable.
- The jury returned a guilty verdict.

## Issues

1. Whether willfully and maliciously setting fire to another’s structure, which would otherwise be a misdemeanor, becomes a capital felony if a dwelling house or a barn with grain is burned as a probable consequence of that act.
2. Whether an indictment charging the felonious burning of a barn with grain permits conviction on proof that the defendant burned a crib containing corn.

## Decision

- The court accepted the rule that a defendant is responsible for the natural and probable consequences of an initial unlawful burning, including felony consequences when a protected structure (such as a dwelling house or a barn with grain) is burned as a probable result.
- The court held, however, that the conviction could not stand because the indictment alleged burning a barn, while the proof showed burning a crib.
- Judgment was reversed.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant who commits an unlawful act is criminally liable for resulting harms that are the natural and probable consequences of that act; foreseeability may elevate the grade of the offense when the aggravated result is a probable consequence.
- In arson-type prosecutions, the State must prove the specific property described in the indictment; a material variance between the charged structure (barn) and the proved structure (crib) requires reversal.

## Conclusion

The court recognized consequence-based criminal liability for foreseeable results of a willful and malicious burning but reversed the conviction because the indictment’s description of the burned property did not match the evidence.


State v. Lauglin, 53 N.C. 354 (N.C. 1861)