## Facts

- William Linscott, Phillip Willey, Jeffrey Colby, and Joel Fuller drove together on December 12, 1984, after Fuller joined the group carrying a sawed-off shotgun.
- Linscott drove to another residence where Fuller obtained 12-gauge shotgun shells.
- Fuller proposed robbing Norman Grenier, a reputed cocaine dealer, by surprise at Grenier’s home; Linscott agreed, expecting Grenier would be reluctant to involve police and expecting a large cash/drug payoff.
- The group went at night to Grenier’s house, located in a wooded rural area; Linscott carried a hunting knife and switchblade, and Fuller carried the shotgun.
- Willey and Colby drove away to return later while Linscott and Fuller approached the house.
- After the back door proved inaccessible, the plan changed: Linscott would break a picture window, enter or partially enter, and announce they had a gun; Fuller would follow immediately behind with the shotgun.
- Linscott broke the window with his body; almost immediately, Fuller fired through the broken window and killed Grenier with a chest shot.
- Fuller took approximately $1,300 from Grenier’s body.
- At a jury-waived trial, the court found Linscott intended to promote the robbery but did not intend to kill; it nonetheless found the killing a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the robbery.

## Issues

1. Whether due process permits conviction for intentional or knowing murder as an accomplice when the defendant intended to promote an armed robbery but did not intend or know a killing would occur, if the killing was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the robbery.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the murder and robbery convictions.
- The court held that accomplice liability may extend to a “secondary crime” committed by the principal if the defendant intended to promote the “primary crime” and the secondary crime was a reasonably foreseeable (natural and probable) consequence of that participation.
- The court concluded this application was not fundamentally unfair and did not violate due process under the Maine Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The court upheld the trial court’s finding that the homicide was reasonably foreseeable given the planned armed robbery, the forced entry, and the known presence of a loaded sawed-off shotgun.

## Legal Principles

- Under Maine’s accomplice-liability statute, a person is liable for another’s conduct if, with intent to promote or facilitate a crime, the person aids or agrees to aid its commission.
- An accomplice to an intended primary offense may be held liable for an additional offense committed during the criminal episode if that additional offense was a reasonably foreseeable (natural and probable) consequence of the primary offense.
- Due process is satisfied where the statute and its interpretation provide fair notice and an objective limitation on accomplice liability through the reasonable-foreseeability requirement, even if the accomplice did not share the principal’s mens rea for the additional offense.
- Participation in a dangerous armed robbery can support a finding that a resulting homicide was reasonably foreseeable, supporting accomplice liability for murder.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Linscott’s murder conviction on an accomplice/foreseeable-consequences theory, holding that due process allows murder liability where the defendant intentionally participated in an armed robbery and the killing was a reasonably foreseeable result of that criminal plan.


State v. Linscott, 520 A.2d 1067 (Me. 1987)