## Facts

- Robert Wayne Loebach and Anna Loebach married shortly before the birth of their son, Michael (born Feb. 13, 1978).
- After moving to Millville, Minnesota, Anna worked as a waitress while Loebach, unemployed, acted as Michael’s primary caretaker during her work hours.
- Before Anna began leaving Michael in Loebach’s care, Michael had no reported “accidents” or bruising; afterward, Michael repeatedly displayed injuries.
- Michael died on June 1, 1978, at three months old.
- Autopsy evidence showed extensive brain hemorrhaging and injuries of differing ages, supporting a conclusion of repeated trauma rather than a single accidental event.
- The state’s theory was that the injuries, including the fatal injuries, occurred while Michael was alone with Loebach.
- Loebach denied abusing Michael and offered alternative explanations for the injuries.
- The prosecution introduced expert testimony describing battered child syndrome and testimony describing common traits associated with “battering parents,” along with limited background testimony about Loebach intended to link those traits to him.
- A jury convicted Loebach of third-degree murder; the district court imposed a maximum 15-year sentence.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by admitting expert “battering parent” profile testimony and related background/trait evidence as part of the state’s proof.
2. Whether the state was required to provide pretrial *Spreigl* notice for its intended use of battered child syndrome and battering-parent evidence.
3. Whether the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by asking Loebach’s wife whether Loebach told her he had beaten their son.
4. Whether the trial court erred in submitting third-degree murder to the jury and in defining that offense in its instructions.

## Decision

- The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- The court held the challenged expert and related background evidence was admissible as used and did not require reversal.
- The court held formal *Spreigl* notice was not required on this record because the defense had actual notice and the evidence was directed to explaining the charged conduct.
- The court held the prosecutor’s questioned inquiry of the wife did not warrant a new trial because any error was harmless in light of the full record.
- The court held the evidence supported instructing on third-degree murder and that the definition provided was proper.

## Legal Principles

- Character or propensity evidence is generally inadmissible to prove conduct, but expert testimony addressing patterns of child abuse may be admitted when its primary function is to explain non-accidental injury and assist the jury in evaluating causation and identity, not merely to show bad character.
- “Battered child syndrome” evidence may be used to show that a child’s injuries are inconsistent with accident and consistent with repeated inflicted trauma.
- Profile-type testimony about “battering parents” may be permitted when closely tied to the medical and circumstantial proof and not presented as an abstract basis to convict.
- Evidence associated with syndrome or explanatory expert testimony is not automatically “other-crimes or bad-acts” evidence requiring *Spreigl* notice; where the defense has actual notice and the evidence is confined to the charged episode and its explanation, additional formal notice may be unnecessary.
- Improper questioning by the prosecutor warrants reversal only if it materially affected the verdict; isolated errors may be harmless given strong independent proof.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Loebach’s third-degree murder conviction for his infant son’s death, ruling that limited battered-child and battering-parent expert testimony was properly admitted for explanatory purposes, that no additional *Spreigl* notice was required given actual notice and the nature of the proof, that the challenged prosecutorial question was harmless, and that the third-degree murder submission and instructions were supported by the evidence and law.


State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981)