## Facts

- A Providence police officer, Thomas Teft, stopped a juvenile (Shane) operating a minibike and suspected it might be stolen because the vehicle identification number was partially scratched and Shane lacked proof of ownership.
- Teft decided not to arrest Shane but to confiscate the minibike and hold it at the police station until Shane could prove ownership.
- John Lough, a more experienced Providence police officer, arrived at the scene. Teft was unsure about the proper steps for confiscating and processing the minibike.
- Lough volunteered to take possession of the minibike and complete the necessary paperwork, and Teft loaded the minibike into Lough’s police cruiser.
- During the shift, Lough moved the minibike from the back seat into the trunk.
- While responding to a call, Lough’s cruiser was involved in a collision with another patrol car, after which Lough returned to the station to complete accident paperwork.
- Rather than securing and logging the minibike at the station for safekeeping as expected, Lough discarded it.
- The State charged Lough under G.L. 1956 § 11-41-3 with embezzlement and fraudulent conversion (larceny by fraudulent conversion) based on his handling and disposal of the minibike.
- A jury convicted Lough, and the trial justice denied his motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. Lough appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.

## Issues

1. Whether a person lawfully entrusted with property can be convicted under G.L. 1956 § 11-41-3 for fraudulent conversion when he discards the property without proof that he converted it to a personal benefit or gain.
2. Whether the trial justice erred in instructing the jury on the elements of embezzlement/fraudulent conversion under § 11-41-3.
3. Whether the trial justice erred in denying Lough’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence.
4. Whether the trial justice erred in denying Lough’s motion for a new trial as against the weight of the evidence.

## Decision

- The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied Lough’s appeal and affirmed the judgment of conviction.
- The Court held that § 11-41-3 does not require the State to prove the defendant derived a personal benefit from the property; discarding entrusted property can constitute fraudulent conversion.
- The Court held that the jury instructions, viewed as a whole, correctly stated the law governing embezzlement and fraudulent conversion under § 11-41-3.
- The Court held that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find fraudulent conversion beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion for a new trial after weighing credibility and the evidence.

## Legal Principles

- Embezzlement/fraudulent conversion under G.L. 1956 § 11-41-3 punishes a person who, having lawful possession of property by virtue of entrustment, fraudulently converts that property contrary to the terms of the entrustment.
- “Conversion” includes exercising unauthorized dominion over entrusted property in a manner inconsistent with the owner’s (or lawful custodian’s) rights, including disposal or destruction; it is not limited to keeping the property or profiting from it.
- Proof of personal gain is not an element of § 11-41-3; the State may satisfy the conversion element by proving intentional, unauthorized disposition of entrusted property.
- Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole and are upheld when they fairly and accurately state the applicable law.
- On a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court must view the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State and determine whether a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- On a motion for a new trial, the trial justice acts as a factfinder who weighs the evidence and assesses witness credibility; appellate review asks whether the trial justice was clearly wrong or overlooked material evidence.

## Conclusion

State v. Lough holds that a police officer entrusted with a confiscated minibike could be convicted of embezzlement and fraudulent conversion under G.L. 1956 § 11-41-3 when he discarded the bike instead of securing it, because the statute focuses on unauthorized control inconsistent with the entrustment and does not require proof that the defendant personally benefited from the property.


State v. Lough, 899 A.2d 468 (2006)