## Facts

- Undercover Kansas City police officer Herbert Robinson bought $20 of crack cocaine from a woman on the porch of a house at 5840 Wabash Avenue, giving police probable cause to obtain a search warrant for the residence.
- About a week later, Robinson returned at night with other officers to execute the warrant; before entry, Robinson approached the front door in an undercover role to make inquiries and confirm drug activity.
- Robinson knocked on the door and asked about buying a “$20 rock” and then asked about the woman from whom he previously purchased crack.
- Michael Dale Lumpkin answered the door holding a gun.
- Another man, Tony Barrett, came to the doorway, yelled at Robinson, pushed him, and struck him with a fist.
- Lumpkin then shot Robinson through the shoulder and shut the door; Robinson did not draw his weapon until after he was shot.
- Lumpkin was charged with first-degree assault and armed criminal action and was sentenced as a prior and persistent offender to consecutive terms of twenty years and ten years, respectively.
- At trial, Lumpkin admitted shooting Robinson and relied on affirmative defenses, including self-defense and defense of premises (defense of habitation), claiming he believed Robinson was attempting a burglary.
- The trial court instructed on self-defense but refused Lumpkin’s requested instruction on defense of premises.
- After conviction, Lumpkin sought postconviction relief under Rule 29.15, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel; the motion court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing.
- Lumpkin appealed both the convictions/sentences and the denial of Rule 29.15 relief; the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, consolidated the appeals.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to submit a defense-of-premises (defense of habitation) instruction.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s closing argument.
3. Whether the reasonable-doubt instruction submitted to the jury was improper or unconstitutional.
4. Whether Lumpkin was entitled to Rule 29.15 relief for ineffective assistance based on trial counsel’s alleged failure to preserve claims of error for appeal.
5. Whether the motion court erred in denying Rule 29.15 relief without an evidentiary hearing on claims including failure to investigate.

## Decision

- The court affirmed Lumpkin’s convictions and consecutive sentences for first-degree assault and armed criminal action.
- The court held the trial court did not err in refusing a defense-of-premises instruction because the evidence did not support an objectively reasonable belief that Robinson was attempting to commit burglary or otherwise forcibly enter the dwelling when Lumpkin shot him.
- The court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial based on the State’s closing argument; the argument fell within allowable bounds (including general comments about crime and the jury’s duty), and the trial court’s response was sufficient.
- The court rejected the challenge to the reasonable-doubt instruction, relying on Missouri precedent approving the applicable pattern instruction against constitutional attack.
- The court affirmed denial of Rule 29.15 relief, concluding Lumpkin failed to establish deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland, including where underlying trial complaints lacked merit.
- The court held the motion court properly denied an evidentiary hearing because the motion did not plead specific, nonconclusory facts not refuted by the record that would warrant relief and show prejudice.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant is entitled to an affirmative-defense instruction only if supported by substantial evidence; the evidence must permit a reasonable jury to find the defense applies.
- Defense of premises (defense of habitation) requires circumstances supporting an objectively reasonable belief that an intruder is attempting or committing an unlawful, forcible entry or a forcible felony in the dwelling; mere knocking and conversation at the door do not, by themselves, support that belief.
- Trial courts have broad discretion in controlling closing argument; mistrial is an extraordinary remedy reserved for prejudice that cannot be corrected by other means.
- Prosecutors may argue general propositions about community safety, the prevalence of crime, and the jury’s role in enforcing the law, so long as the argument does not improperly inflame the jury or misstate the law.
- Missouri’s approved reasonable-doubt pattern instruction has been repeatedly upheld against claims that it lowers the State’s burden of proof.
- Ineffective-assistance claims require proof of deficient performance and prejudice (a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel’s errors).
- A Rule 29.15 evidentiary hearing is required only when the movant pleads specific facts (not conclusions), the facts are not refuted by the record, and the alleged errors resulted in prejudice.

## Conclusion

The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed Lumpkin’s convictions and sentences and the denial of postconviction relief, holding that the evidence did not justify a defense-of-premises instruction, the prosecutor’s closing argument and the reasonable-doubt instruction provided no basis for reversal, and Lumpkin’s Rule 29.15 allegations did not warrant relief or an evidentiary hearing.


State v. Lumpkin, 850 S.W.2d 388 (1993)