## Facts

- Darla Michelle Luster was indicted under Georgia’s Controlled Substances Act for (1) possessing cocaine between January 1, 1991 and March 3, 1991, and (2) delivering and distributing cocaine to her daughter, Tiffany, during the same period.
- During the charged period, Luster was pregnant.
- On March 3, 1991, Tiffany was born.
- The day after birth, a urine sample from Tiffany tested positive for cocaine metabolites.
- Based on the newborn’s test results, the State pursued Count Two on the theory that Luster’s ingestion of cocaine during pregnancy resulted in transplacental transmission of cocaine or metabolites to the fetus/newborn, constituting “delivery” or “distribution.”
- The trial court dismissed Count Two, concluding the delivery/distribution statute was not intended to cover transmission of cocaine metabolites to a fetus caused by maternal ingestion.
- The trial court denied Luster’s motion for discharge and acquittal on Count One (possession).
- The State appealed the dismissal of Count Two, and Luster appealed the denial of discharge and acquittal on Count One; the appeals were consolidated.

## Issues

1. Whether O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), which prohibits delivering or distributing a controlled substance, applies to transplacental transmission of cocaine or cocaine metabolites from a pregnant woman to her fetus/newborn.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Luster’s motion for discharge and acquittal on the cocaine possession charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a).

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the dismissal of Count Two.
- The court held that O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) was not intended to encompass intrauterine transmission of cocaine or its metabolites resulting from a pregnant woman’s ingestion of cocaine.
- The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Luster’s motion for discharge and acquittal on Count One, allowing the possession prosecution to proceed.

## Legal Principles

- Criminal statutes are strictly construed against the State and in favor of liberty; a defendant may not be held liable for conduct outside both the letter and the evident purpose of a penal statute.
- Courts may not extend the reach of penal statutes to novel factual situations by inference when the legislature has not clearly criminalized the conduct.
- General controlled-substance “delivery” and “distribution” provisions do not, without clear statutory direction, criminalize transplacental transfer to a fetus/newborn based solely on prenatal exposure evidenced after birth.

## Conclusion

The court refused to treat prenatal drug exposure evidenced by a newborn’s positive test as “delivery” or “distribution” under Georgia’s controlled-substance statute, while permitting prosecution to continue on the separate charge of cocaine possession.


State v. Luster, 204 Ga. App. 156, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)