## Facts

- Gerald K. Lyerla fired three shots from a .357 magnum at a pickup truck carrying three teenage girls on Interstate 90 in Haakon County, South Dakota.
- One bullet penetrated the cab and killed 17-year-old Tammy Jensen; the other two passengers were injured.
- Another bullet was found in the engine block, and a third was never recovered.
- The incident followed back-and-forth driving behavior; after an attempted pass and acceleration by the pickup, Lyerla exited the interstate, loaded his pistol, reentered, and fired as the pickup attempted to pass.
- Lyerla claimed he feared for his life due to harassment and fired to disable the vehicle rather than to injure occupants.
- After testing, law enforcement repaired and cleaned the pickup truck, disposed of glass fragments and blood-stained seat covers, and released the truck to the family without notifying defense counsel.

## Issues

1. Whether the State’s repair, cleaning, disposal of related materials, and release of the pickup truck without notice to the defense violated due process by destroying potentially exculpatory evidence.
2. Whether “attempted second-degree murder” is a legally cognizable offense when second-degree murder is defined by a reckless (“depraved mind”) mental state but attempt requires specific intent.

## Decision

- The court affirmed Lyerla’s second-degree murder conviction.
- The court held the evidence-handling claim did not establish a due process violation because the alleged exculpatory value was not apparent before destruction, comparable evidence was otherwise available, and bad faith was not shown.
- The court reversed the two convictions for attempted second-degree murder.
- The court held attempted second-degree murder is not a possible crime under South Dakota law because attempt requires specific intent, which is incompatible with a crime defined by recklessness.

## Legal Principles

- A due process violation from lost or destroyed evidence requires proof that the evidence’s exculpatory value was apparent before destruction and comparable evidence is unavailable, or that the State acted in bad faith.
- Criminal attempt requires a specific intent to commit the target offense (intent to bring about the completed crime’s elements).
- Offenses defined by reckless or “depraved mind” conduct (unintentional killings from extreme recklessness) are incompatible with attempt liability because “intending” a reckless mental state is a contradiction.
- Conduct that might be colloquially described as “attempted depraved-heart murder” must be charged, if at all, under other offenses that match the required intent elements.

## Conclusion

The court upheld the murder conviction despite the State’s post-incident handling of the pickup truck because Lyerla did not show apparent exculpatory value, lack of comparable evidence, or bad faith, but it vacated the attempted second-degree murder convictions because attempt’s specific-intent requirement cannot coexist with second-degree murder’s reckless mental state.


State v. Lyerla, 424 N.W.2d 908 (S.D. 1988)