## Facts

- Elizabeth Jones owned Lydia, an enslaved woman, and hired her to John Mann for one year in Chowan County, North Carolina.
- After Lydia committed a “small offence,” Mann attempted to punish her; Lydia fled during the chastisement.
- Mann called for Lydia to stop; when she did not, he shot and wounded her.
- Mann was indicted for assault and battery upon Lydia, convicted in the trial court, and fined five dollars.
- Mann appealed, contending that a master or hirer could not be criminally prosecuted at common law for battery committed against an enslaved person in the course of discipline.

## Issues

1. Whether a “cruel and unreasonable” battery on an enslaved person by a hirer is indictable at common law.
2. Whether a hirer with a temporary property interest in an enslaved person has the same disciplinary authority as the owner, including corporal punishment.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the conviction and entered judgment for Mann.
- The court held that a master is not indictable at common law for battery committed upon an enslaved person.
- The court further held that a hirer, having a right to the enslaved person’s labor during the term of hire, possesses the same power of discipline as the owner and is likewise not indictable for battery committed during the hiring.

## Legal Principles

- At common law, the owner’s disciplinary power over an enslaved person was treated as effectively absolute for purposes of criminal liability; courts would not impose criminal punishment on the master for battery committed in the course of control.
- A hirer with a right to the enslaved person’s labor stands in the owner’s place regarding disciplinary means and is similarly immune from common-law criminal indictment for battery during the term of hire.
- Any criminal restriction on a master’s or hirer’s use of force against an enslaved person required legislative action; absent a statute, criminal prosecution would not lie.
- Limits on a hirer’s conduct were framed, if at all, as private remedies: the owner could seek civil damages if the hirer’s actions diminished the enslaved person’s value.

## Conclusion

The court vacated Mann’s criminal conviction, holding that, absent statutory authorization, neither an owner nor a hirer could be indicted at common law for battery against an enslaved person committed as an incident of disciplinary control, and that the hirer’s temporary interest carried the same coercive authority as ownership for that purpose.


State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (N.C. 1829)