## Facts

- A passenger steamer, the *Mackinac*, carried several hundred passengers in Narragansett Bay.
- The vessel’s boiler exploded near Newport, killing multiple passengers; the indictments at issue concerned three deaths caused by escaping steam after the explosion.
- The captain (McVay) and engineer (Grant) were indicted as principals for manslaughter, alleged to have resulted from criminal negligence in operating a boiler known to be worn, corroded, defective, and unsafe.
- A third defendant (Kelley) was indicted as an accessory before the fact on allegations that, before the killings, he knowingly aided, counseled, and procured the captain and engineer to create steam and operate the unsafe boiler while transporting passengers.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant may be indicted and convicted as an accessory before the fact to manslaughter arising through criminal negligence.

## Decision

- On certification of a question of law before trial, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island answered the certified question yes.
- The court held that a defendant may be indicted and convicted as an accessory before the fact to manslaughter arising through criminal negligence.
- The court reasoned that pre-offense counseling or procurement of grossly negligent conduct is compatible with a homicide offense in which death is unintended.

## Legal Principles

- Accessory-before-the-fact liability may attach to manslaughter based on criminal negligence when the accessory intentionally counsels, commands, or procures the principals’ grossly negligent conduct that foreseeably endangers human life.
- “Involuntary” manslaughter describes the unintended result (death), not the absence of volitional conduct; one may voluntarily engage in, or direct, conduct performed wantonly or in a grossly careless manner.
- “Malice” in this context can refer to general criminal intent—an unlawful intent shown by directing dangerous conduct in utter disregard of consequences to human life—without an actual intent to kill.

## Conclusion

The court sustained the legal sufficiency of charging an accessory before the fact in a criminally negligent manslaughter case, holding that intentional procurement of foreseeably lethal, grossly negligent conduct can support accessory liability even though the resulting deaths were unintended.


State v. McVay, 47 R.I. 292, 132 A. 436 (R.I. 1926)