Facts
- Jesse Miner, Renee Gardner, and other protestors opposed deer hunting during a special hunt at Murphy–Hanrehan Park Reserve in Minnesota.
- The protestors entered the hunting area, yelled at or near hunters, and made noise that frightened deer away from the area where hunters were located.
- Minnesota charged Miner and Gardner under Minn. Stat. § 97A.037 (1994), which made it a crime to intentionally interfere with lawful hunting with intent to “prevent, disrupt, or dissuade” the taking of wild animals, and also prohibited disturbing wild animals and certain trespass conduct.
- Miner and Gardner moved to dismiss, arguing § 97A.037 violated the First Amendment because it restricted protected expression and failed First Amendment standards; they also argued the statute was vague and overbroad and unconstitutional as applied to their protest.
- The district court denied the motion to dismiss.
- After trial, the trespass counts were dismissed, but Miner and Gardner were convicted on the remaining § 97A.037 counts; the court stayed imposition of sentence and placed them on probation for one year.
- Miner and Gardner appealed, renewing their constitutional challenges to § 97A.037.
Issues
- Does the portion of Minn. Stat. § 97A.037 that criminalizes interference with a legal hunter based on an “intent to dissuade” violate the First Amendment?
- If the “intent to dissuade” language is unconstitutional, is it severable so the remainder of § 97A.037 can remain in force?
- After severance, is the remaining statute a valid time, place, and manner restriction (or conduct regulation) consistent with the First Amendment?
- After severance, is the statute unconstitutionally vague or overbroad?
- After severance, is the statute unconstitutional as applied to Miner and Gardner’s anti-hunting protest activity?
Decision
- The court held the “intent to dissuade” portion of Minn. Stat. § 97A.037 is unconstitutional because it restricts protected expression in violation of the First Amendment.
- The court held the unconstitutional “intent to dissuade” language was severable, leaving the rest of § 97A.037 operative.
- The court held the statute, as narrowed, is not an invalid time, place, and manner restriction and does not violate the First Amendment.
- The court held the statute, as narrowed, is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
- The court held the statute, as narrowed, is constitutional as applied because Miner and Gardner’s conduct amounted to intentional interference with a lawful hunt and disturbance of wild animals, not merely speech.
- Disposition: convictions affirmed (review later denied by the Minnesota Supreme Court).
Legal Principles
- A law that penalizes expression because of its communicative purpose or message (such as targeting attempts to “dissuade” lawful hunting) is a First Amendment problem and may be invalid as a content- or viewpoint-based restriction.
- Expressive motive does not immunize conduct; the government may punish intentional, conduct-based interference with lawful activity even when the actor is trying to communicate.
- When part of a statute is unconstitutional, courts may sever the invalid portion and uphold the remainder if the balance can function independently and is consistent with legislative intent.
- A content-neutral restriction tied to conduct in a defined setting can be valid if it serves significant governmental interests, is not broader than necessary for those interests, and leaves adequate alternative means for expression.
- A statute is not void for vagueness if its terms, read in context and with an intent requirement, give ordinary people fair notice of what is prohibited and limit arbitrary enforcement.
- A statute is not facially overbroad if its legitimate reach substantially outweighs any applications that would burden protected speech.
Conclusion
State v. Miner held that Minnesota could not criminalize interference with hunting merely based on an “intent to dissuade,” because that provision burdened protected expression, but the court severed that clause and upheld the remaining hunter-harassment and wildlife-disturbance prohibitions as constitutionally applied to protestors who intentionally interfered with a lawful hunt by entering the hunting area, yelling at hunters, and driving deer away; the convictions were affirmed.