## Facts

- John R. Moon, an M.B.A. student, was hired by Sigma Chi alumni to help reestablish a university chapter and served as fundraiser, renovation project manager, live-in resident advisor, and (unpaid) chapter treasurer.
- As treasurer, Moon repeatedly transferred fraternity funds from chapter accounts to himself or to Marsh Island Development Company (MIDCO), a corporation in which he held a significant ownership interest.
- He used the funds primarily to renovate a Bangor townhouse with the aim of later obtaining conventional residential financing.
- Moon concealed the transfers from the fraternity’s Board of Trustees and obtained no authorization for them.
- During the relevant period, Moon had low bank balances and substantial debt; he continued taking funds even after recognizing that obtaining financing would be difficult.
- Moon admitted taking about $120,000 between 1991 and 1994, repaying more than $100,000, and still owing $19,972.41.
- His defense argued lack of intent to deprive, asserting he intended to repay and believed the property’s equity would cover the withdrawals.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by limiting defense expert testimony concerning Moon’s financial condition and intent.
2. Whether the jury instructions on theft by unauthorized taking or transfer and theft by misapplication of property accurately stated the law and properly required proof of intent to deprive.
3. Whether the jury was properly instructed on when the intent to deprive must exist for theft under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 353.
4. Whether the court improperly admitted unduly remote evidence offered to prove Moon’s mental state.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the conviction for Class B theft under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 353.
- The trial court acted within its discretion in limiting expert testimony to objective financial matters and excluding opinions that would invade the jury’s role on intent and credibility.
- The jury instructions, read as a whole, fairly and adequately described the elements of theft under both theories and repeatedly required proof of intent to deprive beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The instruction on timing of intent properly required that intent to deprive exist when Moon exercised unauthorized control or misapplied entrusted property, not merely when he later failed to repay.
- Admission of evidence bearing on intent, even if arguably remote, was within the court’s discretion and did not warrant reversal.

## Legal Principles

- Trial courts have broad discretion to limit expert testimony, especially where proposed opinions would effectively decide the defendant’s intent or credibility for the jury.
- Theft under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 353 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant exercised unauthorized control or knowingly dealt with entrusted property in an unauthorized manner, with intent to deprive the owner.
- The intent to deprive must exist at the time of the unauthorized taking/transfer or misapplication, and may be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as concealment and continued withdrawals despite foreseeable inability to repay.
- Jury instructions are reviewed in their entirety; reversal is not required if the charge, taken as a whole, correctly conveys the governing law and essential elements.
- Evidence relevant to intent may be admitted despite temporal distance if its probative value is not substantially outweighed by risks of unfair prejudice or confusion; evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and harmless error.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Moon’s theft conviction, concluding that the trial judge properly constrained expert testimony on intent, the jury was correctly instructed on both theft theories and the required timing of intent to deprive, and the challenged intent-related evidence was admissible without reversible error.


State v. Moon, 755 A.2d 527 (Me. 2000)