## Facts

- Calvin Morgan and Austin Yates Harrell were business partners in a produce business, Geno’s.
- On July 4, 1984, Harrell was shot and killed at the business premises with a shotgun.
- The State presented evidence supporting premeditation, including eyewitness testimony describing Morgan shooting Harrell as Harrell was about to sit outside and Morgan’s post-shooting statement to a neighbor.
- Physical evidence regarding the slug’s path and the body’s position supported the State’s theory that the shooting was not the result of an active struggle.
- The State introduced evidence of motive tied to business conflict, including testimony that Harrell planned to close the business.
- The State also offered testimony that Morgan had stated earlier that someone would see his name in the headlines before midnight.
- Harrell had manic-depressive disorder and a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.16 at death.
- Morgan admitted he shot Harrell but claimed self-defense, asserting Harrell attacked him with a hatchet and knife.
- Morgan also testified that Harrell had no weapon in his hand when he was shot.

## Issues

1. Whether it was error to allow cross-examination about Morgan’s prior shotgun-pointing incident as impeachment under Rule 608(b) and/or as other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b), and whether any error was prejudicial.
2. Whether admission of statements about Harrell’s business intentions and dealings was inadmissible hearsay, and whether any error required reversal.
3. Whether the trial court’s failure to instruct on the right of a non-aggressor to stand his ground (no duty to retreat) constituted reversible error under plain-error review when the defense did not request the instruction or object.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the first-degree murder conviction and life sentence.
- The court held it was error to allow impeachment under Rule 608(b) based on prior assaultive conduct not probative of truthfulness.
- The court held the prior-acts evidence was not properly admitted under the State’s Rule 404(b) theory because it effectively invited propensity reasoning.
- The court found the evidentiary error non-prejudicial given the brief questioning and strong evidence of premeditated murder.
- The court found that any hearsay-related error was non-prejudicial because substantially similar evidence was admitted elsewhere without objection, including through Morgan’s testimony.
- The court held it was error to omit a stand-your-ground instruction if the jury found Morgan was not the aggressor, but the unpreserved error did not amount to plain error.

## Legal Principles

- Rule 608(b) permits inquiry into specific conduct only when it is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness; prior violent acts generally do not satisfy that standard.
- Rule 404(b) does not permit admission of other acts when the practical effect is to show a defendant’s violent character or propensity rather than a proper non-character purpose.
- An evidentiary error warrants reversal only if there is a reasonable possibility that the result would have been different absent the error.
- Even if evidence is hearsay, admission is often harmless when the same facts are admitted elsewhere without objection or are otherwise cumulative.
- A defendant’s failure to request a jury instruction or object to its omission limits appellate review to plain error; relief requires a fundamental error that likely affected the verdict when the record is considered as a whole.
- When supported by the evidence, a non-aggressor is entitled to a self-defense instruction explaining there is no duty to retreat; omission may be error but is not necessarily plain error.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed Morgan’s conviction, holding that improper impeachment and potential hearsay did not prejudice the verdict and that, although a stand-your-ground instruction should have been given on Morgan’s theory, the unpreserved omission did not constitute plain error in light of the overall evidence supporting premeditated murder.


State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 340 S.E.2d 84 (N.C. 1986)