## Facts

- Jerry Patrick Mullen was tried for delivering marijuana (hashish) based on a July 27, 1971 sale to an undercover agent, Steven Keenley, after a cooperating individual, Linda Archibald, brought Mullen to the agent’s vehicle.
- The State’s evidence showed Mullen sold three ounces of hashish to Keenley for $255.
- Mullen testified he was persuaded by Archibald to help obtain hashish and raised an entrapment defense, portraying himself as induced rather than predisposed.
- During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Mullen about prior drug activity, including whether he had previously sold marijuana to Keenley; Mullen denied it to the best of his knowledge.
- After the defense rested, counsel sought to exclude testimony about an alleged April 22, 1971 marijuana sale to Keenley; the State confirmed it intended to present evidence of that incident, which was the subject of a separate pending prosecution in which Mullen had been arraigned.
- Over objection, the trial court permitted the State to reopen cross-examination and elicited Mullen’s admission that he had sold or delivered marijuana to Keenley on April 22, 1971.
- Motions for mistrial and for new trial based on the prejudicial impact of introducing the pending April 22 offense were denied, and the jury convicted Mullen of the July 27 delivery.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to reopen cross-examination to elicit Mullen’s admission of a separate, pending April 22 marijuana sale.
2. Whether admitting that pending-offense evidence was improper other-crimes evidence that unfairly prejudiced the jury, notwithstanding Mullen’s entrapment defense.
3. Whether the resulting prejudice deprived Mullen of a fair trial requiring reversal.

## Decision

- The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held it was reversible error to allow reopening of cross-examination to elicit an admission about a separate, pending marijuana charge and to place that pending offense before the jury as substantive proof.
- The court rejected the view that assertion of entrapment allowed the State to introduce a pending charge in a manner that effectively invited conviction based on propensity.

## Legal Principles

- Evidence of crimes other than the one charged is generally inadmissible when its primary effect is to show propensity and inflame prejudice; any exceptions must be narrowly applied.
- When entrapment is raised, the prosecution may offer evidence relevant to predisposition, but such evidence remains subject to exclusion if its prejudicial effect outweighs its legitimate probative value.
- Introducing a defendant’s separate pending prosecution as other-acts evidence is especially prejudicial because it risks turning the trial into a joint adjudication of distinct offenses without the safeguards of a separate trial.
- A trial court abuses its discretion when procedural choices—such as reopening cross-examination after the defense rests—are used to inject highly prejudicial other-crimes evidence lacking adequate protection against misuse by the jury.

## Conclusion

The conviction for the July 27 delivery was reversed because the jury was allowed to hear Mullen’s admission to a separate, pending April 22 marijuana sale, and the entrapment defense did not justify introducing that pending charge in a way that created an unacceptable risk of conviction based on propensity rather than proof of the charged offense.


State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974)