## Facts

- Joshua Jonathan Murray owned an automobile shop that modified cars for racing; Harris worked there.
- Murray and Harris took a modified Volkswagen GTI on a late-night test drive; Murray drove while Harris rode in the front passenger seat and monitored performance using his senses and a laptop.
- In a residential area with a 35 mph speed limit, Murray accelerated to over 90 mph, lost control, struck and sheared a power pole, and the car burst into flames.
- Harris suffered serious physical injuries.
- Murray conceded at trial that Harris sustained “serious physical injury,” that Murray acted recklessly, and that Murray’s recklessness was a but-for cause of Harris’s injuries.
- Murray argued he was not criminally responsible because Harris knowingly and voluntarily participated in the risky test drive.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant who recklessly causes serious physical injury under ORS 163.165(1)(c) is relieved of liability when the injured person knowingly and voluntarily participated in the same reckless activity.
2. Whether the victim’s participation negates “legal causation” or constitutes an applicable defense (such as consent or assumption of risk) barring conviction.

## Decision

- The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for third-degree assault (and the affirmed judgments below).
- The court held that the victim’s willing participation in the defendant’s reckless conduct did not sever legal causation.
- The court declined to recognize a nonstatutory defense based on victim participation or assumption-of-risk concepts.

## Legal Principles

- For third-degree assault under ORS 163.165(1)(c), a defendant’s conceded recklessness and but-for causation are not negated merely because the victim voluntarily joined the dangerous conduct.
- A victim’s participation in the same foreseeable risk created by the defendant generally does not constitute a superseding cause that cuts off criminal responsibility.
- Civil-law “assumption of risk” concepts do not create a general criminal defense absent legislative authorization.
- Consent-based defenses in Oregon criminal law are limited; voluntary participation in dangerous activity does not amount to consent to serious physical injury in a way that bars prosecution in this context.

## Conclusion

The court held that a person may be convicted of third-degree assault for recklessly causing serious physical injury even when the injured party knowingly participated in the risky conduct; neither causation principles nor existing statutory defenses barred liability.


State v. Murray, 343 Or. 48 (2007)