## Facts

- Norman Edward Porter lived in a rented house with his wife (Leblanc-Porter) and two other adults (Davies and Clements); Porter paid the rent and household expenses.
- The adults engaged in sadomasochistic sexual practices, and pornographic materials and sexual devices were present throughout the home.
- Leblanc-Porter’s 15-year-old daughter (D) moved into the household; she was removed from public school and home-schooled.
- Leblanc-Porter decided D should be “trained” to be sexually submissive to Davies; over more than a month, Leblanc-Porter and Davies sexually abused D, including posing her in sexual positions in common areas while others observed.
- Porter did not physically abuse D, but on three charged occasions he was present in a room while D was being sexually abused and displayed.
- Porter did not intervene or attempt to stop the conduct; the state alleged he allowed the display to occur in his home and derived sexual gratification from observing it.
- Porter was convicted of three counts of using a child in a display of sexually explicit conduct (ORS 163.670); the trial court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, and he appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether “permit” in ORS 163.670 requires that the defendant have formal legal authority over the child (e.g., parental or custodial power).
2. Whether evidence of a defendant’s control over the premises, presence during the abuse, and failure to intervene is sufficient for a rational jury to find the defendant “permitted” a child’s participation in a live sexually explicit display.

## Decision

- The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
- The court held that “permit” in ORS 163.670 does not require formal legal authority over the child.
- The court concluded that a rational jury could find Porter “permitted” the child’s participation based on his practical control of the home, his presence during the charged incidents, and his knowing nonintervention.
- The trial court did not err in denying Porter’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

## Legal Principles

- Under ORS 163.670, “permit” is not limited to persons with legal custody or parental status; it can be satisfied by a defendant’s practical ability to allow or prevent the child’s participation in sexually explicit conduct for observation.
- Liability may be supported where the defendant controls the premises where the display occurs, is present while it occurs, knows what is happening, and allows it to continue.
- Prior case descriptions linking “permit” to the ability to forbid do not impose a categorical legal-authority requirement; statutory purpose and context support a functional reading that reaches adults who knowingly allow exploitation in environments they control.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Porter’s convictions, ruling that ORS 163.670’s “permit” element turns on practical power and knowing tolerance of a child’s sexually explicit display—shown here by Porter’s control of the home and presence during the abuse—not on formal legal authority over the child.


State v. Porter, 241 Or. App. 26, 249 P.3d 139 (Or. Ct. App. 2011)