## Facts

- A Washington state trooper stopped Melissa Presba for speeding and discovered her driver’s license was suspended.
- Presba identified herself as Shyla Dashiell (a former friend and neighbor), providing Dashiell’s name, date of birth, prior address, and Social Security number.
- Although some identifying details did not match records, the trooper issued a citation for driving without a license on her person and released Presba.
- Dashiell later learned state records reflected a traffic stop attributed to her, missed court appearances, a suspended license, and an outstanding warrant; her insurance rates increased.
- Dashiell obtained and viewed a video of the stop and identified Presba as the person using her identity.
- The State charged Presba with second degree identity theft (former RCW 9.35.020), forgery, and third degree driving with a suspended license; the jury convicted, including on identity theft.

## Issues

1. Whether the identity-theft statute was “concurrent” with, and thus displaced by, more specific statutes covering obstructing a law enforcement officer (RCW 9A.76.020) or refusal to give information/cooperate (RCW 46.61.020).
2. Whether equal protection required charging first degree criminal impersonation (RCW 9A.60.040) rather than identity theft due to alleged overlap and different penalties.
3. Whether, under the correct construction of the identity-theft statute, evidence was sufficient to prove second degree identity theft.

## Decision

- The Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed the identity-theft conviction.
- The court held the identity-theft statute was not concurrent with obstructing an officer or refusal to give information/cooperate; the State was not required to charge those offenses instead.
- The court held equal protection did not require charging first degree criminal impersonation because its elements differ from identity theft.
- Applying the statute’s plain language, the court concluded the evidence supported identity theft where Presba used a real person’s identifiers to facilitate another crime.

## Legal Principles

- Under the concurrent-statutes doctrine, a more specific statute controls only when two statutes prohibit the same conduct in purpose and effect; otherwise, prosecutors may choose which applicable statute to charge.
- Former RCW 9.35.020 (identity theft) broadly criminalizes knowingly using a real person’s “means of identification” with intent to commit, aid, or abet any crime; it is not limited to financial crimes absent an express statutory limitation.
- Equal protection constraints on charging discretion apply when two statutes punish identical conduct but prescribe different penalties; no violation occurs where the statutes contain materially different elements.
- Identity theft requires use of the identifying information of an actual person, a feature not necessarily required for criminal impersonation and distinct from statutes aimed at interference with law enforcement.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Presba’s second degree identity-theft conviction, ruling that the identity-theft statute applied to using another real person’s identifying information to facilitate a nonfinancial crime during a traffic stop and that neither statutory concurrency principles nor equal protection limited the State’s charging choice on these facts.


State v. Presba, 131 Wash. App. 47 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)