## Facts

- Gregory Ragland was tried by a jury and convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and weapons offenses, including unlawful possession of a weapon.
- A separate charge of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon (requiring proof of a prior felony) was severed to prevent prejudice from disclosure of Ragland’s prior conviction.
- After the initial verdicts, the severed felon-in-possession charge was tried to the same jury.
- In charging the severed count, the trial judge instructed that if the jurors found Ragland previously convicted of robbery and found he possessed the sawed-off shotgun “as you have indicated,” then they “must” find him guilty.
- Ragland challenged the instruction as effectively directing a verdict (by treating possession as already decided) and argued that the use of “must” improperly eliminated the jury’s ability to acquit despite proof.

## Issues

1. Whether the instruction on the severed felon-in-possession charge improperly directed a guilty verdict by binding the jury to its prior finding on the possession element.
2. Whether a defendant has a constitutional right to jury nullification, requiring instructions that preserve or disclose the jury’s power to acquit despite proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed Ragland’s conviction on the felon-in-possession count and remanded for a new trial on that charge.
- The court held the instruction was improper because, in context, it told the jury to rely on its prior determination of possession rather than decide that element independently.
- The court rejected the claim that the Constitution requires instructions informing the jury of nullification or forbids the general use of “must” in describing the duty to convict when all elements are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Legal Principles

- A criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to every element of the charged offense; the court may not effectively remove an element from the jury’s consideration.
- A trial judge may not direct a guilty verdict, even indirectly, including by instructing a jury that a factual element has already been established by its earlier verdict in the same proceeding.
- When a “status” offense is severed and tried before the same jury, instructions must ensure the jury makes an independent determination of each element on the severed charge.
- Jury nullification is a jury power, not a defendant’s right; courts need not instruct juries about that power and may instruct that conviction is required if all elements are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Conclusion

The court ordered a new trial on the severed felon-in-possession charge because the instruction linked guilt to the jury’s prior verdict and improperly treated the possession element as settled, while also holding that defendants have no constitutional entitlement to jury-nullification instructions and that “must convict” language is not inherently unlawful.


State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189, 519 A.2d 1361 (N.J. 1986)