## Facts

- The State of Vermont prosecuted Samuel Maduro (also known as Samuel Penney) for (1) delivery of cocaine and (2) conspiracy to sell cocaine.
- The State alleged that, in early 1999, Maduro used a juvenile, K.M., to assist his cocaine dealing from his apartment.
- According to the State’s theory and the affidavit supporting the charges, Maduro had K.M. hold crack cocaine, cash, and a scale so that police would not find them during searches connected to Maduro’s furlough conditions.
- The conspiracy allegation also included an incident in which Maduro allegedly asked K.M. to hand crack cocaine to an individual in exchange for cash at the apartment while Maduro was not present.
- The delivery count focused on a May 1, 1999 incident in which Maduro allegedly delivered approximately seventy-seven grams of crack cocaine to K.M. at the apartment; K.M. later provided cocaine to police.
- At trial, the court allowed the State to present testimony from Keith Merrow about Maduro’s uncharged cocaine transactions with Merrow during early 1999.
- Merrow testified that he went to Maduro’s apartment several times to pick up cocaine for Merrow to resell to Merrow’s own customers.
- Merrow’s customers were unknown to Maduro and did not come to the apartment with Merrow.
- Merrow testified that he once saw a girl in the apartment, but she did not participate in or observe any drug transaction between Merrow and Maduro.
- The trial court admitted Merrow’s testimony as evidence the jury could consider on both the conspiracy and delivery counts.
- The jury convicted Maduro on both counts, and the trial court denied Maduro’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the delivery charge.

## Issues

1. Did the trial court err by admitting Merrow’s testimony about uncharged drug dealings as direct evidence of the charged conspiracy with K.M.?
2. Did the trial court err by admitting Merrow’s testimony to show Maduro’s intent on the delivery charge (and otherwise as prior-bad-acts evidence)?
3. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, was the evidence sufficient to deny Maduro’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the delivery count?

## Decision

- The Vermont Supreme Court reversed Maduro’s convictions and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held it was error to treat Merrow’s testimony as direct proof of the charged conspiracy with K.M. because Merrow described separate drug sales involving different participants and a different distribution path.
- The court further held that admitting the same evidence to prove intent (and permitting the jury to consider it broadly on both counts) created an unacceptable risk that the jury would convict based on propensity reasoning rather than proof of the charged agreement and charged delivery.
- The court concluded the error was not harmless in light of the weakness of the linkage between Merrow’s transactions and the crimes charged, and because the jury was told it could use the evidence on both counts.
- The court also addressed Maduro’s sufficiency challenge to the delivery count and concluded that, even without the improperly admitted testimony, there was evidence from which a rational jury could find delivery beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore, retrial was not barred.

## Legal Principles

- Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may not be admitted simply to show a defendant’s character or propensity to commit the charged offense; it must be admitted, if at all, for a valid non-propensity purpose and must satisfy the probative-value versus unfair-prejudice balance.
- Courts must be cautious with prior-acts evidence in criminal cases; where the probative value of such evidence is doubtful, that doubt is resolved in favor of exclusion.
- Uncharged drug transactions are not “direct evidence” of a charged conspiracy merely because they involve the same defendant or occur in a similar time period; the State must connect the evidence to the charged agreement and participants rather than using it as general proof that the defendant dealt drugs.
- When a court permits the jury to use other-acts evidence broadly (rather than limiting it to a narrow, legally proper purpose), the risk of an improper propensity inference increases and can require reversal.
- On review of a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and asks whether any rational trier of fact could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt; if so, reversal for trial error permits retrial.

## Conclusion

State v. Samuel Maduro holds that testimony about a defendant’s separate, uncharged cocaine sales to another reseller—without a meaningful connection to the alleged agreement with the juvenile named in the information—should not be treated as direct conspiracy proof or used broadly to show intent, because the probative value is weak and the risk of propensity-based conviction is high; the Vermont Supreme Court therefore reversed both convictions and remanded for a new trial, while also concluding the evidence on the delivery count was sufficient to allow retrial.


State v. Samuel Maduro, 174 Vt. 302, 816 A.2d 432 (2002)