## Facts

- Eduardo Santiago was convicted of capital felony for a contract killing committed in exchange for a snowmobile and was sentenced to death under Connecticut’s capital punishment statute.
- On direct review in 2012, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but reversed the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty-phase hearing because the trial court failed to disclose certain confidential mitigating records.
- While the case remained pending, Connecticut enacted Public Act 12-5 (2012), prospectively repealing the death penalty for crimes committed on or after April 25, 2012, while keeping existing death sentences legally in place for pre-repeal offenses.
- Santiago sought reconsideration, arguing that after Public Act 12-5, continued imposition and execution of death sentences for pre-repeal crimes violated the Connecticut Constitution.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court granted reconsideration to decide whether Connecticut’s death penalty could constitutionally continue for the remaining class of pre-repeal offenders.

## Issues

1. Whether, after Public Act 12-5’s prospective repeal, continuing to impose and carry out death sentences for pre-repeal capital crimes violates the Connecticut Constitution’s protections against cruel and unusual punishment and its due process guarantees (Conn. Const. art. I, §§ 8, 9).
2. If unconstitutional, what sentence must replace Santiago’s death sentence.

## Decision

- The Connecticut Supreme Court vacated Santiago’s death sentence.
- The court held that, after Public Act 12-5, Connecticut’s death penalty no longer comports with contemporary standards of decency and no longer serves any legitimate penological purpose, making it unconstitutional under the Connecticut Constitution.
- The case was remanded with directions to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release on the capital felony count.
- The court’s reasoning barred executions of other prisoners already sentenced to death under Connecticut law.

## Legal Principles

- The Connecticut Constitution’s protections in article I, §§ 8 and 9 support an independent state constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment that may provide broader protection than the federal Eighth Amendment.
- In assessing cruel and unusual punishment under the Connecticut Constitution, the court evaluates contemporary standards of decency, including legislative action, actual state practice, and broader jurisdictional trends.
- A prospective legislative repeal of capital punishment is strong evidence of changed societal values and informs whether the punishment remains constitutionally permissible for any offenders.
- After prospective repeal, maintaining executions for a small, date-defined class of offenders heightens concerns about arbitrariness and undermines coherent justifications for imposing the ultimate punishment.
- Post-repeal, the death penalty was found not to advance legitimate penological goals such as deterrence or retribution; vengeance is not a permissible constitutional basis for punishment.
- When a punishment is unconstitutional, the appropriate remedy is resentencing to the statutorily authorized alternative: life imprisonment without the possibility of release.

## Conclusion

Connecticut’s high court concluded that once the legislature prospectively abolished the death penalty, the state constitution no longer permitted executions even for pre-repeal capital offenders, requiring vacatur of Santiago’s death sentence and resentencing to life without release.


State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 122 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2015)