## Facts

- Judith Scruggs, a single parent, lived with her two children in a three-bedroom apartment and worked roughly sixty hours per week at two jobs.
- Her 12-year-old son, Daniel, was repeatedly bullied at school, had many absences, often had poor hygiene, and sometimes defecated in his pants.
- Daniel slept in his bedroom closet and kept knives and a homemade spear there for protection.
- The Department of Children and Families (DCF) was aware of Daniel’s difficulties, inspected the apartment during its involvement, and closed its file on Daniel five days before his death.
- Daniel died by suicide in the apartment closet.
- Investigators entering the apartment observed extreme clutter and an unpleasant odor.
- The state prosecuted Scruggs under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-21(a)(1) on the theory that maintaining a cluttered, unclean home willfully placed Daniel in a situation likely to injure his mental health.

## Issues

1. Whether Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-21(a)(1) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to prosecuting a parent for maintaining a cluttered and unsanitary home alleged to risk injury to a child’s mental health.
2. If the statute was constitutional as applied, whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Scruggs willfully placed Daniel in a situation likely to impair his mental health.

## Decision

- The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the conviction.
- The court held that § 53-21(a)(1) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Scruggs’ conduct.
- Because the conviction was reversed on vagueness grounds, the court did not need to resolve the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim as a basis for affirmance or reversal.

## Legal Principles

- Due process prohibits criminal liability under a statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct is forbidden or that permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
- An as-applied vagueness challenge is evaluated in light of the statute’s text, prior judicial applications, and the defendant’s circumstances to determine whether fair notice existed for the charged conduct.
- When assessing notice under § 53-21(a)(1), culpability is measured by an objective standard focused on whether the conduct would likely impair the mental health of a typical child of the relevant age, not the particular child’s unusual vulnerabilities.
- Prior agency involvement may affect the notice inquiry where the responsible child-protection authority inspected the conditions and signaled noncriminal handling, supporting a reasonable belief that the conduct had not crossed a criminal line.
- Applying a broadly worded child-endangerment statute to mental-health risk premised on domestic disorder, without clear limiting standards or close precedent, increases the danger of ad hoc enforcement.

## Conclusion

The court concluded that prosecuting Scruggs for risk of injury based on household clutter and unsanitary conditions, framed as a mental-health danger, did not provide fair notice under § 53-21(a)(1) and posed unacceptable risks of arbitrary enforcement, requiring reversal of her felony conviction.


State v. Scruggs, 279 Conn. 698, 905 A.2d 24 (Conn. 2006)