## Facts

- Jesse Smith went to dinner and drinks with S.L., a female friend who viewed him only as a friend and was dating someone else.
- Over the evening, S.L. consumed a large amount of beer while they visited multiple bars.
- On the drive to Smith’s home, S.L. passed out in Smith’s car.
- Smith told S.L. it was unsafe for her to drive and offered his bed, saying he would sleep on the couch.
- S.L. invited Smith to sleep on the other side of the bed, but she did not intend to have sexual intercourse with him.
- S.L. testified she awoke during the night feeling something on her hips, then fell back asleep.
- Later, S.L. awoke to find she was naked from the waist down and had what appeared to be semen (with a dark pubic hair) in her genital area.
- S.L. left without confronting Smith and later sought medical care; a sexual-assault exam was performed and law enforcement was contacted.
- Smith was charged and tried for rape under K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(C), alleging sexual intercourse when the victim was incapable of consenting due to alcohol and that condition was known to Smith or reasonably apparent to him.
- Smith testified he did not remember anything from falling asleep on the couch until waking the next morning.
- The State presented testimony from another woman, L.S., who described similar conduct by Smith; Smith challenged the admission and scope of that testimony and also challenged limits on evidence about S.L.’s sexual history under Kansas’ rape-shield law.
- A jury convicted Smith of rape, and the district court imposed a 184-month prison sentence; Smith appealed.

## Issues

1. Was the evidence sufficient to prove S.L. was incapable of giving consent due to alcohol and that Smith knew (or it was reasonably apparent) she was incapable of consenting under K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(C)?
2. Did the district court err by refusing Smith’s requested voluntary-intoxication instruction and instead instructing that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to rape, and if so, was the error harmless?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion in applying Kansas’ rape-shield statute to exclude evidence about S.L.’s prior sexual conduct?
4. Did the district court err in admitting L.S.’s testimony as prior bad acts/similar-act evidence, including whether its probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice and whether limiting instructions were adequate?
5. Did alleged errors, considered together, deny Smith a fair trial (cumulative error), and were there reversible sentencing errors?

## Decision

- The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed Smith’s conviction and sentence.
- The court held the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that S.L. was incapable of consenting due to alcohol and that Smith knew, or it was reasonably apparent, that she was incapable of consenting.
- The court held the district court erred in refusing to instruct on voluntary intoxication, but concluded the error did not require reversal because it was harmless in light of the record as a whole.
- The court upheld the district court’s rape-shield rulings excluding evidence of S.L.’s prior sexual conduct because the proffered evidence did not meet statutory requirements for admission and was not shown to be relevant to a material issue in the case.
- The court upheld admission of L.S.’s testimony as similar-act evidence under Kansas evidentiary law, finding no reversible abuse of discretion.
- The court rejected Smith’s remaining claims, including cumulative error and sentencing challenges.

## Legal Principles

- Sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is reviewed by considering whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational factfinder could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Under K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(C), rape may be proven by showing (1) sexual intercourse occurred, (2) the victim was incapable of giving consent because of the effects of alcohol (or drugs), and (3) that incapacity was known to the defendant or reasonably apparent to the defendant.
- A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication when there is evidence the defendant was intoxicated to a degree that could affect the ability to form the required intent for a specific-intent crime; refusal to give a legally supported instruction can be error.
- Instructional error does not require reversal if the appellate court concludes the error was harmless, meaning it did not affect the verdict or the defendant’s substantial rights when the record is considered as a whole.
- Kansas’ rape-shield statute generally bars evidence of a complaining witness’ prior sexual conduct unless the statutory procedure is followed and the proffered evidence is shown to be relevant and admissible for a permitted purpose.
- Evidence of other acts may be admitted under Kansas evidentiary rules (including K.S.A. 60-455 principles) for approved non-character purposes (such as intent, plan, or absence of mistake), subject to weighing probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice and, when appropriate, a limiting instruction.
- Cumulative error requires multiple errors that collectively prejudice the defendant; where the appellate court finds only a single harmless error (or no error), cumulative-error relief is not warranted.

## Conclusion

State v. Smith affirmed a rape conviction arising from sexual intercourse with an alcohol-incapacitated victim, holding the evidence was sufficient to prove both incapacity and the defendant’s awareness, and further holding that the trial court’s failure to give a voluntary-intoxication instruction was error but harmless; the court also upheld the district court’s rape-shield rulings, admission of similar-act testimony, rejection of cumulative-error claims, and the sentence imposed.


State v. Smith, 39 Kan. App. 2d 204, 178 P.3d 672 (2008)