## Facts

- On July 10, 1980, around 6:30 a.m., Rachael Conlin was severely assaulted in a motel room in Pasco, Washington, suffering a cracked nose, bruises, black eyes, and facial lacerations requiring stitches.   
- At the hospital about 8:00 a.m., Conlin told a police officer that Nova Richard Smith (defendant) was her assailant, stated she was afraid, and was advised that action required her testimony in court.   
- Around noon, Conlin met a detective at the police station, said she was willing to press charges and testify, and understood that giving a voluntary sworn statement could lead to criminal action against Smith.   
- Using a form containing Miranda warnings, Conlin wrote in her own words a detailed statement describing the assault and identifying Smith as the attacker; she then signed it under oath before a notary, subject to penalty of perjury.   
- Later that day, Smith allegedly chased Conlin, forcibly took her keys, and left, prompting another police call.   
- At Smith’s trial approximately a month later, Conlin unexpectedly testified that another man, Gomez, had assaulted her and that Smith had actually helped her.   
- Conlin admitted she had signed the earlier sworn statement and acknowledged being upset with Smith but claimed she had wrongly identified him.   
- The trial court admitted Conlin’s sworn statement as substantive evidence under ER 801(d)(1)(i); the jury convicted Smith of second-degree assault.   
- After the verdict, the trial judge granted Smith a new trial, ruling that ER 801(d)(1)(i) did not apply because Conlin’s statement had not been made in a “proceeding.”   
- The State appealed; the Washington Court of Appeals certified the case to the Washington Supreme Court.   

## Issues

1. Whether ER 801(d)(1)(i) permits admission, as substantive evidence, of a trial witness’s prior inconsistent statement when the statement was made in a sworn, written complaint to investigating police officers, under oath and penalty of perjury before a notary, but not in a formal courtroom or grand jury proceeding.   

## Decision

- The Washington Supreme Court held that, under the facts of this case, Conlin’s prior sworn, notarized statement to police was admissible as substantive evidence under ER 801(d)(1)(i).   
- The court interpreted the phrase “trial, hearing, or other proceeding” in ER 801(d)(1)(i) to encompass Conlin’s statement because it bore sufficient indicia of reliability—voluntary, under oath, subject to penalty of perjury, and made with awareness of its likely use in criminal proceedings.   
- Declining to adopt a broad categorical rule about all sworn statements to police, the court limited its holding to circumstances like those present here.   
- The order granting a new trial was reversed, and the jury’s verdict finding Smith guilty of second-degree assault was reinstated.   

## Legal Principles

- **ER 801(d)(1)(i) (prior inconsistent statements not hearsay):** A prior statement is not hearsay if (1) the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, (2) the statement is inconsistent with the declarant’s trial testimony, and (3) it was given under oath subject to penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding.   
- **“Other proceeding” scope:** The term “other proceeding” in ER 801(d)(1)(i) is not confined strictly to formal court or grand jury appearances; under certain circumstances, a sworn, notarized statement to police can qualify if it exhibits strong reliability factors.   
- **Reliability as a touchstone:** The court emphasized that admission of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence turns on reliability—voluntariness, oath, awareness of legal consequences, and opportunity for cross-examination at trial—rather than the mere label of the setting in which the statement was made.   
- **Use of prior inconsistent statements substantively:** When ER 801(d)(1)(i) is satisfied, a prior inconsistent statement may be considered not only for impeachment but also for its truth, enabling the jury to treat it as substantive proof of the facts asserted, including identification of a defendant.   

## Conclusion

The Washington Supreme Court concluded that a victim’s sworn, notarized prior inconsistent statement to police, made voluntarily and under penalty of perjury with an understanding of its likely use in court, satisfies ER 801(d)(1)(i)’s “other proceeding” requirement. Accordingly, the statement was properly admissible as substantive evidence, and the trial court erred in granting a new trial. The judgment granting a new trial was reversed, and Smith’s conviction for second-degree assault was reinstated.


State v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 856, 651 P.2d 207 (Wash. 1982)