## Facts

- The State of Maine charged Sandra Stevens with rape of a thirteen-year-old boy under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 252(1)(A).
- The indictment alleged Stevens “engage[d] in sexual intercourse” with “any person, not his spouse, who has not in fact attained his 14th birthday.”
- At the time, “sexual intercourse” was defined in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(B) as “any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.”
- Stevens moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the rape statute did not apply when the alleged victim was male.
- The Superior Court (Kennebec County) agreed and dismissed the indictment, reasoning that the statute—despite gender-neutral wording—was intended to carry forward former statutory-rape law focused on female victims, relying on Criminal Law Revision Commission comments to §§ 252 and 253.
- The State appealed the dismissal pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A.

## Issues

1. Whether 17-A M.R.S.A. § 252(1)(A), written in gender-neutral terms (“any person”), applies when the alleged victim is a boy under age 14.
2. Whether Criminal Law Revision Commission comments suggesting continuity with earlier female-only statutory-rape law can justify limiting § 252 contrary to its enacted text.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the statutory language is gender-neutral and, on its face, applies to male and female victims.
- The court found no enactment context showing a clear legislative intent to limit § 252 to female victims.
- The court ruled that the Criminal Law Revision Commission comments—prepared for an initial proposed draft—could not justify departing from the statute’s plain language as enacted.
- The order dismissing the indictment was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- When statutory language is unambiguous, courts apply its ordinary meaning unless the context of enactment clearly shows a different legislative intent.
- Enacted statutory text controls over drafting history and commission commentary, especially where the commentary would add a limitation the Legislature did not write.
- A victim class described as “any person” is read as gender-neutral; courts will not insert a sex-based restriction absent explicit text.
- Statutory definitions describe the prohibited act (here, penile–vaginal penetration) but do not, by themselves, narrow who may qualify as the protected person when the operative provision is written without a sex limitation.

## Conclusion

State v. Stevens held that Maine’s rape statute, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 252(1)(A), protects “any person” under age 14, including boys, and that commission comments implying a female-only rule could not override the Legislature’s gender-neutral wording; the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment was vacated and the case returned for further proceedings.


State v. Stevens, 510 A.2d 1070 (1986)