## Facts

- Erin Kirsten Stubsjoen met Jerry Johnson, Donald Ponis, and Jeanna Bomber while they were drinking; the group later drove to a park and then to a remote wooded area, with Bomber’s six-month-old baby in a car seat.
- While Johnson, Ponis, and Bomber left the car briefly, Stubsjoen remained with the baby; when they returned, both Stubsjoen and the baby were gone.
- Stubsjoen removed the baby from the car and obtained a ride to a fire station, where she gave a false name and claimed the baby was her own, stating she needed transportation to another town.
- A police chaplain agreed to transport Stubsjoen; during the trip, Stubsjoen left the chaplain’s car with the baby and then took a taxi to a restaurant.
- Police located and arrested Stubsjoen at the restaurant.
- The State charged Stubsjoen with second-degree kidnapping, alleging “abduction” by “secreting or holding” the child “in a place where [the child] is not likely to be found.”

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find “abduction” by “secreting” the child in a place where she was not likely to be found.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding proffered defense testimony and related out-of-court statements as hearsay or irrelevant under the evidence rules.
3. Whether the trial court’s failure to instruct on the statutory definition of “intent” was reversible error reviewable for the first time on appeal as a manifest constitutional error.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the second-degree kidnapping conviction.
- The evidence was sufficient to prove “abduction” by “secreting,” because Stubsjoen’s misrepresentations and repeated movement of the child supported a finding that the child was kept from those seeking her.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the challenged defense statements; they were irrelevant, did not qualify as admissible prior consistent statements, or were self-serving and not admissible as admissions.
- The missing “intent” definition did not warrant reversal; the asserted instructional defect was not a manifest error affecting a constitutional right requiring discretionary review.

## Legal Principles

- “Secreting” under the kidnapping “abduction” definition does not require hiding in an isolated location; it may occur in public places if circumstances make discovery by those concerned with the victim unlikely.
- Evidence is sufficient if, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Statements offered to show a declarant’s state of mind may be nonhearsay but must be relevant to a material issue.
- Prior consistent statements are admissible only if made before a motive to fabricate arose.
- A defendant’s out-of-court statements that are self-serving do not qualify as admissions of a party-opponent.
- Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- Appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims is discretionary and requires a manifest error producing obvious injustice.

## Conclusion

The court upheld the kidnapping conviction, construing “secreting” broadly to include conduct that keeps a victim from being found even in public settings, while also deferring to trial-level evidentiary discretion and declining to treat the omitted “intent” definition as a reviewable, outcome-determinative constitutional error.


State v. Stubsjoen, 48 Wn. App. 139, 738 P.2d 306 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)