Facts
- Dale Thibeault was charged with burglary after several valuables were taken from an apartment leased by David and Debbie Gardner.
- The State’s evidence tended to show that, on the evening of December 9, 1977, Thibeault entered the Gardners’ apartment and removed property.
- Thibeault called David Gardner as a defense witness.
- Gardner testified that he and Thibeault had been friends for several years and that Gardner had previously given Thibeault blanket permission to enter the apartment “at any time.”
- On cross-examination, Gardner testified he had not given Thibeault permission to take anything from the apartment.
- At the close of evidence, Thibeault requested a jury instruction reflecting his theory that he had a license or privilege to enter the apartment.
- Although the trial court agreed to instruct on “license or privilege,” the instruction tied that element to Thibeault’s intent to commit theft and allowed the jury to find him guilty even if it credited Gardner’s testimony that Thibeault had permission to enter.
- A jury in the Superior Court (Penobscot County) found Thibeault guilty of Class B burglary under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 401(1)(B), and he was sentenced to six years in prison.
- Thibeault appealed, arguing (among other points) that the “license or privilege” instruction misstated an element of burglary.
Issues
- In a prosecution for burglary under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 401(1)(B), must the State prove as a separate element that the defendant knowingly entered (or remained) knowing he was not licensed or privileged to do so?
- Did the trial court’s instruction erroneously permit the jury to treat the defendant’s intent to steal as sufficient proof that his entry was “without license or privilege,” even if a tenant had given blanket permission to enter?
- If the instruction misstated the elements of burglary, was the error prejudicial requiring a new trial?
Decision
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine sustained the appeal.
- The court vacated the burglary conviction and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held that the jury instruction on the elements of burglary—specifically the “license or privilege” requirement—was prejudicially incorrect.
- With the exception of this instructional error, the court rejected Thibeault’s other assignments of error.
Legal Principles
- Under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 401(1), burglary requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (a) knowingly entered or surreptitiously remained in a structure knowing he was not licensed or privileged to do so, and (b) acted with intent to commit a crime in the structure.
- The “not licensed or privileged” element is distinct from the “intent to commit a crime therein” element; the State may not satisfy the first element merely by proving the second.
- Evidence that an occupant or co-tenant gave the defendant general permission to enter can support a finding that the entry was licensed or privileged, even if the defendant later intended to commit (or did commit) a crime inside.
- A jury instruction that links “license or privilege” to the defendant’s criminal purpose in a way that permits conviction without a clear finding that the entry (or remaining) was unlicensed misstates an essential element of burglary.
- An instruction that allows the jury to convict despite evidence of permission to enter is prejudicial when it may have led the jury to bypass the required finding on license or privilege.
Conclusion
Because the trial court’s charge allowed the jury to effectively equate Thibeault’s intent to steal with proof that he lacked a license or privilege to enter—despite testimony that he had blanket permission to enter the apartment—the instruction misstated the burglary elements, so the Maine court vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial.