## Facts

- Gerald Roy Thompson was a high school principal and basketball coach.
- A student (Jane Doe) alleged Thompson compelled her to engage in acts of oral sexual intercourse on more than one occasion.
- The charging documents alleged Thompson threatened that Jane Doe would not graduate from high school unless she complied.
- Thompson was charged with two counts of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of sexual assault.
- Thompson moved to dismiss the two sexual-intercourse-without-consent counts, arguing the alleged threat did not satisfy the statute’s definition of “without consent.”
- The district court dismissed the two counts; the State appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether allegations that a school official threatened a student with non-graduation, if she refused sexual acts, satisfy the statutory element that intercourse occurred “without consent” (limited to force or threat of imminent death, bodily injury, or kidnapping).

## Decision

- The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the two sexual-intercourse-without-consent counts.
- The court held the alleged threat (withholding graduation) was not “force” and was not a threat of imminent death, bodily injury, or kidnapping as required by the statute.
- The court treated the statutory definition of “without consent,” including the clause excluding “other circumstances” relating to force or threat, as controlling and not subject to judicial expansion.
- The ruling left intact the separate sexual assault count, which was not the subject of the appeal.

## Legal Principles

- When a criminal statute defines “without consent” as compulsion by force or by threat of imminent death, bodily injury, or kidnapping, the State must allege facts fitting those categories to charge sexual intercourse without consent.
- A statutory clause stating that no other circumstances relating to force or threat may be considered creates a closed set of qualifying threats; courts may not add non-enumerated forms of coercion through interpretation.
- Charging sufficiency is measured against the statute’s elements; coercive conduct outside the statute’s defined categories may be condemnable yet still fail to establish the charged offense.

## Conclusion

Because the charging allegations described only an academic threat—non-graduation—rather than force or a threat of imminent death, bodily injury, or kidnapping, the State failed to plead the statutory “without consent” element, and dismissal of the two counts was affirmed.


State v. Thompson, 243 Mont. 28, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990)