## Facts

- Scott W. Veale was indicted for timber trespass and theft by unauthorized taking after a landowner alleged Veale cut and removed oak timber from the landowner’s property.
- Veale maintained he owned the property and timber and asserted a conspiracy by state and local officials to deprive him of property rights.
- Two consulted real-estate attorneys concluded Veale’s ownership claim lacked merit; Veale accused his appointed public defenders of joining the alleged conspiracy, impairing attorney–client communication.
- Defense counsel moved for a competency determination, stating Veale could not assist in his defense.
- Two mental-health evaluations produced conflicting opinions: a psychiatrist found Veale had a paranoid disorder but was competent; a forensic psychologist found a delusional disorder and incompetence.
- While represented, Veale attempted pro se filings contesting the need for an evaluation and requesting new counsel; the clerk rejected the filings under a rule limiting submissions to counsel of record or parties who formally appear pro se.
- The trial court held an evidentiary competency hearing where both experts testified; Veale was present but did not testify.
- The trial court found Veale incompetent to stand trial but not dangerous, dismissed the criminal charges, and did not confine him.
- After remand proceedings, the trial court declined to vacate the incompetency determination; Veale appealed, asserting procedural due process violations under the state and federal constitutions.

## Issues

1. Whether the procedures used to determine Veale’s incompetency to stand trial violated procedural due process under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, given asserted reputational and related interests.
2. Whether the same procedures violated procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court’s incompetency determination and denial of Veale’s motion to vacate that determination.
- The court held the competency procedures satisfied state procedural due process as fundamentally fair.
- The court held the same procedures also satisfied federal procedural due process.
- The court rejected Veale’s claim that additional procedures were constitutionally required, including challenges related to rejected pro se filings and his non-testimony at the competency hearing.

## Legal Principles

- A procedural due process claim first requires a legally protected interest; competency determinations can implicate reputational interests sufficient to trigger due process protections.
- Under the state constitution, the ultimate standard is fundamental fairness, assessed through a balancing approach considering: (1) the private interests affected, (2) risk of erroneous deprivation and value of added safeguards, and (3) governmental interests and burdens.
- Competency to stand trial requires the capacity to understand the proceedings and to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; competency at trial is an essential condition of a fair criminal proceeding.
- Due process is generally satisfied where the defendant is represented by counsel, receives mental-health evaluations (including competing expert views), and the court makes an individualized decision after an evidentiary hearing with expert testimony subject to examination.
- The fact that charges are dismissed without confinement may lessen the degree of liberty impact in evaluating what process is due, though reputational interests may still be implicated.

## Conclusion

The court held that, even assuming an incompetency finding affects protected reputational interests, the combination of representation by counsel, multiple expert evaluations, and an evidentiary hearing provided constitutionally adequate procedural safeguards under both the New Hampshire and U.S. Constitutions, and the trial court was not required to vacate the incompetency determination after dismissal of the charges.


State v. Veale, 972 A.2d 1009 (N.H. 2009)