## Facts

- On June 4, 1991, Ellis Wilkinson entered a grocery store, approached the cashier, demanded money, produced a gun, and pointed it at the cashier while ordering her to open the cash register.
- The cashier refused to open the register, and Wilkinson took the entire cash register and left the store.
- Wilkinson left his wallet at the scene, which contained identification with his name and photograph, making identification straightforward.
- Police located and arrested Wilkinson the next day at the Salvation Army Lodge on North Boulevard.
- After his arrest, Wilkinson admitted the robbery but denied having or using a gun.
- Wilkinson also acknowledged he had prior felony convictions and had been released from prison only weeks before the robbery (April 16, 1991).
- At trial, the central disputed fact was whether Wilkinson had a gun, which separated armed robbery from a lesser robbery offense.
- The State cross-examined Wilkinson about a parole supervision report dated June 1, 1991, containing Wilkinson’s handwritten statement that he could not pay his $43 parole supervision fee for June.
- Defense counsel objected that the parole-report questioning was irrelevant to the gun issue and unfairly prejudicial, but the trial court overruled the objection and allowed the questioning as motive evidence; the parole report had already been introduced into evidence.
- The jury found Wilkinson guilty of armed robbery.
- The State filed a habitual offender bill; Wilkinson was adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender and resentenced.
- On appeal to the Louisiana First Circuit, Wilkinson challenged (among other claims) the sufficiency of the evidence that he was armed, the admission/use of the parole report, prosecutor comments during closing argument, and the habitual offender adjudication (including identity proof).

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilkinson committed armed robbery by using a dangerous weapon (a gun).
2. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to question Wilkinson about a parole supervision report showing he could not pay a $43 parole fee, as evidence of motive, over relevance and prejudice objections.
3. Whether the prosecutor’s challenged remarks during closing/rebuttal closing argument required reversal.
4. Whether the State sufficiently proved Wilkinson’s identity as the person previously convicted for purposes of the second-felony habitual offender adjudication.

## Decision

- The court affirmed Wilkinson’s armed-robbery conviction, habitual-offender adjudication, and sentence.
- The court held the evidence was sufficient to support armed robbery because the victim’s testimony that Wilkinson produced and pointed a gun, if believed, established the dangerous-weapon element; credibility determinations were for the jury.
- The court found no reversible error in allowing cross-examination about the parole report: it was relevant to motive, and any risk of unfair prejudice did not outweigh its probative value, particularly because the report was already in evidence and the jury already knew Wilkinson was a convicted felon on parole.
- The court rejected the complaints about the prosecutor’s closing-argument remarks, concluding the comments did not warrant reversal under the standards governing argument and prejudice.
- The court upheld the habitual offender adjudication, concluding the State adequately proved Wilkinson was the same person previously convicted, including through Wilkinson’s own trial testimony admitting prior felonies.

## Legal Principles

- Armed robbery under La. R.S. 14:64 requires proof of a taking of something of value from the person or immediate control of another, by force or intimidation, while the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon.
- On appellate review for sufficiency, the question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt; the jury decides credibility.
- Evidence is relevant if it tends to make a fact of consequence more or less probable; evidence offered to show motive may be admissible even when motive is not an element of the offense.
- Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers such as unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues; trial courts have broad discretion in making these calls.
- When a jury is already aware of a defendant’s parole status and prior convictions through properly admitted evidence, limited additional questioning about a parole document may be found not unfairly prejudicial.
- Prosecutors are given wide latitude in closing argument; reversal is warranted only when argument is so prejudicial that it deprives the accused of a fair trial.
- In habitual offender proceedings, the State must prove the defendant is the same person as the individual named in the predicate convictions; identity may be shown through documentary evidence and other linking proof, including the defendant’s own admissions at trial.

## Conclusion

The Louisiana First Circuit affirmed Wilkinson’s armed-robbery conviction and second-felony habitual-offender sentence, holding that the victim’s testimony supported the jury’s finding that Wilkinson used a gun, that cross-examination about Wilkinson’s parole supervision report noting an unpaid $43 fee was permissible motive evidence without unfair prejudice in context, that the complained-of closing argument did not justify reversal, and that Wilkinson’s identity for habitual-offender purposes was sufficiently proven, including by his own trial testimony.


State v. Wilkinson, 612 So. 2d 833 (1992)