## Facts

- Eric M. Young was the pastor of a local church supervised within the United Methodist Church (UMC).
- Young had a private office in the church secured by a special lock that could not be opened with the church’s master key.
- Three keys existed: Young kept two, and the church administrator kept a third key in a locked drawer/credenza in her office.
- Testimony indicated no one was permitted to enter Young’s office without his permission, except limited access for business purposes.
- The church provided Young a desktop computer located in his private office.
- The computer was not networked to other computers, and the church had no written policy on computer use, monitoring, or who could access it.
- The administrator could perform maintenance on the computer, but only while Young was present; she was not permitted to log on when he was absent.
- The church’s internet service provider notified the administrator that spam was linked to the church’s IP address.
- In response, the administrator ran spyware/“spybot” on Young’s computer and observed questionable website addresses, then reported the situation up the church chain.
- A UMC official (district superintendent), after consulting the bishop, instructed the local staff-parish chair to contact law enforcement and allow officers to see the computer; Young was instructed not to return to the church until a meeting could occur.
- When officers arrived, the staff-parish chair opened Young’s office with the key kept by the administrator and signed consent-to-search forms for the office and the computer.
- Officers searched the office and computer without a warrant and found evidence supporting a child-pornography charge.
- After the search, officers interviewed Young (after Miranda warnings) and confronted him with a printout of bookmarked websites taken from the computer; Young made incriminating statements and signed a consent form for a memory device found in the office.
- Young moved to suppress the physical evidence and his statements as products of an unlawful search; the trial court granted the motion, and the State appealed.

## Issues

1. Did Young have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his private church office and the stand-alone computer located there?
2. Did church officials have actual authority (common authority) to consent to a warrantless search of Young’s office and computer?
3. If not, did officers reasonably rely on the officials’ apparent authority to consent?
4. If the search was unlawful, were Young’s post-search statements and related consent tainted as fruit of the poisonous tree?

## Decision

- The First District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the order suppressing the evidence and the later statements.
- The court held Young established a legitimate expectation of privacy in his private office and the computer, based on the special lock, restricted access practices, and the absence of a computer-use or monitoring policy.
- The court held the consenting church officials lacked actual authority to consent because they did not share mutual use or joint access/control of Young’s office or computer for most purposes; organizational or ecclesiastical authority within the UMC did not substitute for common authority under the Fourth Amendment.
- The court held apparent authority did not validate the search because, given the circumstances, officers lacked a reasonable basis to believe the consenting officials had joint access or control over the private office and computer.
- The court held Young’s statements (and related consent to search a memory device) were properly suppressed because the interview was causally connected to the unlawful search, including officers’ use of materials derived from the search during questioning, and the State did not show sufficient attenuation.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant may challenge a search only by showing a legitimate expectation of privacy that is both subjectively held and objectively reasonable.
- A private workplace office can carry Fourth Amendment protection when access is meaningfully limited and the setting does not include policies or practices that reduce privacy expectations.
- Third-party consent requires actual “common authority,” meaning mutual use of the place or item and joint access or control for most purposes; property ownership, job titles, or internal institutional governance rules do not alone supply that authority.
- Apparent authority validates consent only when the facts known to officers at the time would cause a reasonable officer to believe the third party had common authority; where circumstances indicate exclusive control by the defendant, officers must make reasonable inquiries rather than assume authority.
- Evidence derived directly or indirectly from an unconstitutional search may be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree; Miranda warnings alone do not automatically remove the taint when questioning is driven by the unlawful search and its products.
- Ecclesiastical governance and doctrines addressing church autonomy do not change the Fourth Amendment analysis of governmental searches and third-party consent.

## Conclusion

In *State v. Young*, the First District affirmed suppression of evidence from a warrantless search of a pastor’s private church office and office computer because church officials lacked common authority to consent and officers could not reasonably rely on apparent authority; the court also suppressed the pastor’s later statements and related consent as fruits of the unlawful search.


State v. Young, 974 So. 2d 601 (2008)