## Facts

- Asheek Yusuf and Carissa LeJeune were in a romantic relationship and, as the trial court found, lived together in an apartment in Torrington, Connecticut.
- Evidence showed Yusuf restricted LeJeune’s movements, controlled her contacts, and monitored her whereabouts.
- On July 29–30, 1998, LeJeune made a phone call to a friend Yusuf had forbidden her to contact; Yusuf confronted her, forced her into a car, returned her to the apartment, and assaulted her.
- The state presented additional evidence of abuse during the incident, including physical injury, threats, and confinement, supporting charges of second-degree kidnapping, second-degree assault, first-degree unlawful restraint, threatening, and cruelty to persons.
- Police came to the apartment after the incident; LeJeune spoke with officers and consented to a search of the premises, which yielded physical evidence used at trial.
- The state introduced evidence of Yusuf’s prior uncharged acts of abuse against LeJeune and offered expert testimony (a sociologist) concerning battered woman syndrome to explain LeJeune’s behavior and assist the jury’s evaluation of her credibility.
- Yusuf was convicted after a jury trial and appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the warrantless apartment search was unlawful because LeJeune lacked authority to consent.
2. Whether admitting evidence of Yusuf’s prior uncharged misconduct was an abuse of discretion.
3. Whether admitting expert testimony on battered woman syndrome was an abuse of discretion because it was insufficiently grounded, irrelevant, or invaded the jury’s role.
4. Whether prosecutorial remarks in closing argument, individually or cumulatively, deprived Yusuf of a fair trial.

## Decision

- The judgment of conviction was affirmed.
- The trial court’s finding that LeJeune and Yusuf lived together was not clearly erroneous; LeJeune therefore had common authority to consent to the search, and the suppression motion was properly denied.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting prior uncharged misconduct evidence; it was relevant to explain the relationship and to support the battered woman syndrome evidence, and its probative value outweighed unfair prejudice.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting battered woman syndrome expert testimony; it assisted the jury in understanding behavior potentially inconsistent with abuse and did not supplant the jury’s credibility determinations, particularly given limiting instructions.
- Any improper aspects of the prosecutor’s summation did not reach constitutional prejudice; the trial court’s instructions mitigated any harm, and the remarks were not so egregious, frequent, or central as to deny due process.

## Legal Principles

- A warrantless search is permissible when voluntary consent is given by a person with common authority over the premises; appellate review defers to trial-court factfinding on shared occupancy unless clearly erroneous.
- Evidence of prior uncharged misconduct may be admitted for a nonpropensity purpose, including providing relationship context and explaining a victim’s conduct, if its probative value outweighs unfair prejudice.
- Expert testimony on battered woman syndrome may be admitted to help jurors assess whether a complainant’s behavior is consistent with patterns associated with battering and to aid credibility evaluation, so long as the jury remains the ultimate factfinder and proper limiting instructions are used.
- Claims of prosecutorial misconduct in argument require contextual review of impropriety and prejudice; reversal is warranted only if the argument so infected the trial with unfairness as to amount to a denial of due process, including consideration of curative instructions and cumulative effect.

## Conclusion

The Appellate Court upheld Yusuf’s convictions, concluding that the victim’s consent validated the warrantless search because she was a co-occupant, the prior-abuse and battered woman syndrome evidence was properly admitted for permissible purposes with adequate safeguards, and the prosecutor’s closing argument did not deprive Yusuf of a fair trial.


State v. Yusuf, 70 Conn. App. 594, 800 A.2d 590 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002)