Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)

Facts

  • Nebraska enacted a criminal statute banning “partial birth abortion,” permitting the procedure only when necessary to save the mother’s life.
  • The statute defined the prohibited abortion as one in which a physician “partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery,” including delivery of “a substantial portion” for a procedure the physician knows will kill the unborn child.
  • Violation was a felony and mandated automatic revocation of the physician’s medical license.
  • Dr. LeRoy Carhart, a physician who performed abortions including later-term procedures, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the law was vague and imposed an undue burden on abortion access.
  • The federal district court held the statute unconstitutional, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Issues

  1. Whether a state may criminalize a specified abortion method without an exception for preservation of the pregnant patient’s health under the Due Process Clause as interpreted in Roe and Casey.
  2. Whether statutory language that can be read to cover the standard second-trimester D&E method imposes an undue burden by chilling physicians from providing constitutionally protected abortions.
  3. Whether a federal court may refuse a narrowing construction of a criminal abortion statute when such a construction is not fairly supported by the statutory text.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court affirmed, holding Nebraska’s statute unconstitutional.
  • The Court found the statute invalid because it lacked an exception permitting the prohibited procedure when necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, to preserve the pregnant patient’s health.
  • The Court also held the statute’s definitions could reasonably be read to reach not only “intact D&X” but also the more common D&E procedure, creating a substantial risk that physicians would forgo D&E to avoid prosecution and license loss.
  • The Court declined to adopt the state’s proposed narrowing reading because it was not fairly possible given the text and the statute’s criminal and professional penalties.
  • Under Casey, a pre-viability abortion regulation is unconstitutional if it has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a person seeking an abortion (an “undue burden”).
  • Post-viability restrictions must allow abortions necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the pregnant patient.
  • A state may not regulate abortion methods in a way that endangers patients’ health; where medical evidence shows a banned method may be safer for some patients, a health exception is required.
  • A criminal abortion statute that is broad enough to deter physicians from using the standard, lawful method can impose an undue burden by chilling access to constitutionally protected care.
  • Courts will not impose a narrowing construction that is not fairly supported by the statutory language, particularly where criminal liability and professional licensure consequences are triggered.

Conclusion

The Court held Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion ban unconstitutional because it omitted a health exception required under governing abortion precedents and because its breadth threatened to prohibit or chill the standard D&E method, thereby imposing an undue burden on the right to choose abortion.