## Facts

- Lonnie K. Stephens was convicted in Indiana state court of attempted rape based on events at Melissa Wilburn’s trailer home on March 17, 1987.
- Wilburn testified Stephens entered the trailer while she slept, became aggressive after she refused him, attempted to rape her, and fled when she escaped to a bedroom.
- Stephens testified Wilburn invited him in and the sexual encounter was consensual, but she became angry after he made sexually explicit remarks referencing her prior sexual conduct with another man and “switching partners,” then ordered him to leave and later fabricated an attempted-rape allegation.
- At trial, the court applied Indiana’s rape shield statute to bar Stephens from testifying to the specific content of his explicit remarks because they referenced Wilburn’s prior sexual conduct.
- Stephens was permitted to testify generally that he made “certain statements” that angered Wilburn and that her anger motivated a false accusation, but he could not repeat the exact words.
- The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
- Stephens sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing the exclusion violated his constitutional right to testify and present a defense; the district court denied the petition.

## Issues

1. Whether excluding the specific content of Stephens’s sexually explicit remarks under Indiana’s rape shield statute violated his federal constitutional right to testify and to present a complete defense.
2. Whether the excluded remarks were required to be admitted as part of the “res gestae” to complete the story of the charged events.
3. On federal habeas review, whether the state court’s evidentiary ruling so impaired the defense as to amount to a due process violation.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the denial of habeas relief.
- The court held the rape-shield-based restriction did not violate Stephens’s constitutional right to testify or present a defense.
- The court reasoned Stephens was allowed to present the substance of his defense (consent; complainant anger; motive to fabricate) and was limited only from stating explicit words that disclosed prior sexual conduct.
- The court concluded the excluded details were at most incrementally probative and were properly excluded given the state’s interests served by the rape shield statute.
- The court rejected the argument that “res gestae” required admission because the jury could understand Stephens’s account without the sexual-history details.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant’s constitutional right to testify and present a defense is subject to reasonable evidentiary limits that serve legitimate state interests.
- Rape shield laws may constitutionally exclude evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct when the exclusion does not significantly impair core elements of the defense.
- In assessing constitutional error from defense-evidence exclusions, courts consider whether the defendant could still present the central theory of the case and whether the excluded material adds substantial probative value relative to prejudice and policy interests.
- The “res gestae” rationale does not compel admission of otherwise excludable sexual-history evidence where the defense narrative remains coherent without the excluded specifics.

## Conclusion

The en banc court held that barring Stephens from repeating the explicit, sexual-history-laden content of his remarks to the complainant did not violate his constitutional right to testify or present a defense, because he was still able to present his consent-and-fabrication theory while the state permissibly enforced rape shield protections.


Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc)