## Facts

- During a heated public meeting, the defendant advanced several steps toward the plaintiff while using threatening gestures and language.
- Observers, including the plaintiff, understood the defendant’s movement as an attempt to inflict force; however, the defendant halted before actual contact was made.
- The plaintiff, confronted with the defendant’s aggressive advance, experienced a genuine and immediate apprehension that unlawful force would be applied.
- No blow was struck, and no bodily injury was sustained; the encounter ended without any physical impact.
- The incident nevertheless caused the plaintiff mental distress arising from the imminent and unlawful nature of the threat.

## Issues

1. Whether the common-law tort of assault is satisfied by a reasonable apprehension of immediate harm, or whether some degree of physical contact is indispensable.
2. Whether the temporal proximity and manner of the defendant’s approach rendered the threat “immediate” in the legal sense required to constitute assault.
3. Whether, assessed objectively, a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have apprehended the infliction of unlawful force at the moment the defendant advanced.

## Decision

- The court concluded that the essence of assault lies in creating a reasonable apprehension of imminent force; the absence of actual contact does not exonerate a defendant whose conduct fulfils that criterion.
- On the facts, the defendant’s approach, coupled with threatening demeanor, was sufficiently proximate in time and space to place the plaintiff in fear of instant harm.
- The plaintiff’s apprehension was held to be objectively reasonable and not the product of idiosyncratic or exaggerated sensitivity.
- Accordingly, liability for assault was established and judgment entered for the plaintiff.

## Legal Principles

- Assault is constituted where the defendant, by word or deed, intentionally or recklessly causes the claimant to anticipate the immediate application of unlawful force.
- The test for apprehension is objective: would a reasonable person, placed in the claimant’s circumstances, expect that force was about to be applied?
- “Immediate” does not demand split-second proximity; it requires that the threatened force could realistically occur without significant intervening delay.
- Physical contact is relevant to battery, not assault. The two torts are distinct: assault protects the interest in mental security from threatened violence, whereas battery protects bodily integrity from actual violence.
- The defendant’s intent can be inferred from conduct; deliberate advancement with menacing gestures permits the inference that the defendant intended the claimant to fear imminent force.
- Where intention and reasonable apprehension coincide, the tort is complete even if, owing to subsequent restraint or change of mind, the threatened force is never delivered.
- The case affirms that purely verbal threats, if accompanied by circumstances negating immediacy (for example, a large distance or obvious incapacity), are insufficient; conversely, conduct that conveys a present capacity to inflict harm is actionable even without overt words.
- Damages in assault may be awarded for the anxiety and disturbance occasioned by the threat, underscoring the law’s concern with psychological as well as physical safety.

## Conclusion

Stephens v Myers definitively clarifies that assault is made out whenever a defendant’s intentional acts induce in the plaintiff a reasonable and contemporaneous fear of unlawful force. The ruling disconnects liability from actual contact, focusing instead on the immediacy and credibility of the threat. By emphasizing objective reasonableness, the judgment balances the protection of personal security with the need to exclude trivial or fanciful claims, thereby shaping the modern contours of the tort of assault.


Stephens v Myers (1830) 4 C & P 349