## Facts

- A Georgia statute barred owners or keepers of billiard tables from allowing persons under 21 to play without parental consent.
- Myers Stern operated a billiard saloon.
- Frank Talmadge sought to play billiards at Stern’s establishment.
- Stern asked Talmadge his age; Talmadge stated he was 21 and appeared to Stern to be of full age.
- Talmadge was actually about six months under 21.
- The State charged Stern with unlawfully allowing a minor to play billiards.
- At a bench trial, Stern offered evidence that he inquired about age, relied on Talmadge’s representation, and reasonably believed Talmadge was of age.
- The trial court excluded the proffered evidence, treated Stern’s belief as irrelevant, found him guilty based on Stern’s admission and Talmadge’s minority, and imposed a fine.

## Issues

1. Whether, under the statute, an honest and reasonable mistake of fact as to the player’s age is legally relevant to guilt.
2. Whether the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the defendant made inquiry and reasonably believed the player was of full age, effectively applying strict liability.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the conviction and remanded.
- The trial court erred by excluding evidence bearing on whether Stern honestly and reasonably believed the patron was of full age.
- The statute was not construed to make the proprietor an insurer of a patron’s age absent clear legislative direction.
- The reasonableness of Stern’s inquiry and belief was for the fact-finder to weigh after admitting the evidence.

## Legal Principles

- Absent clear legislative intent to impose strict liability, penal statutes are generally construed to require culpability and to permit an honest, reasonable mistake-of-fact defense when the mistake negates guilt.
- Where liability turns on a factual condition such as the person’s minority, the defendant’s knowledge, belief, and reasonable diligence in ascertaining that fact are material to culpability.
- Evidence offered to show reasonable inquiry and good-faith reliance on a patron’s representation of age is admissible; its persuasive force is a question for the trier of fact, not a basis for exclusion.

## Conclusion

The court set aside Stern’s conviction because the trial judge excluded evidence that Stern, after inquiry, reasonably believed the player was 21; without clear statutory language imposing strict liability, such mistake-of-fact evidence must be admitted and may defeat criminal responsibility.


Stern v. State, 53 Ga. 229 (Ga. 1874)