## Facts

- Willard Stewart worked as a marine engineer for Dutra Construction Company aboard the dredge *Super Scoop* during a Boston Harbor project.
- The *Super Scoop* was a floating dredging platform with a bucket used to remove silt and deposit it onto adjacent scows.
- Although it had limited self-propulsion, it could move short distances by manipulating anchors and cables and typically shifted position periodically during dredging operations.
- Stewart was seriously injured while repairing a scow’s engine when the *Super Scoop* and the scow collided.
- Stewart sued Dutra under (1) the Jones Act for negligence as a “seaman” and (2) 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), alleging negligence by the owner of a “vessel.”
- The district court granted summary judgment to Dutra on the Jones Act claim on the ground that the *Super Scoop* was not a “vessel in navigation,” and later granted summary judgment on the § 905(b) claim.
- The First Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted review to decide whether a dredge is a “vessel” under the LHWCA.

## Issues

1. Whether a dredge that is capable of moving and carrying workers and equipment over water is a “vessel” under the LHWCA’s incorporated statutory definition.
2. Whether the definition of “vessel” turns on a craft’s primary purpose and whether it is moving at the time of injury, or instead on practical capability for maritime transportation.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court held that the *Super Scoop* dredge is a “vessel” under the LHWCA.
- The Court applied the statutory definition encompassing any watercraft or artificial contrivance “used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”
- The Court rejected narrower tests requiring that the craft be primarily engaged in transportation or be in transit at the relevant time.
- The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with treating the dredge as a “vessel,” allowing pursuit of the § 905(b) claim premised on vessel-owner negligence.

## Legal Principles

- For the LHWCA, a “vessel” includes any watercraft or artificial contrivance practically capable of maritime transportation, even if its primary purpose is not transport.
- Practical capability, not momentary use or motion, is the controlling inquiry; a craft is not excluded merely because it is moored, anchored, or temporarily stationary while performing its work.
- Special-purpose floating structures (including dredges) may qualify as vessels when they can transport workers and equipment over water as a practical matter.
- A craft falls outside vessel status when it has been permanently moored or otherwise rendered practically incapable of maritime transportation.
- The “in navigation” concept (in Jones Act discussions) does not require actual movement at the time of injury; it generally concerns whether the craft remains an instrument of maritime transportation rather than withdrawn from service.

## Conclusion

The Court interpreted “vessel” broadly to cover watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation, holding that a dredge that periodically moves and carries crew and equipment over water qualifies as a LHWCA vessel despite its dredging-focused function and temporary stationary operation.


Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481 (2005)