## Facts

- In 1882, Lawrence Doyle and his wife conveyed land to their son, Frank Doyle, by warranty deed containing restrictions on Frank’s power to reconvey or mortgage.
- The 1882 deed provided that if Frank died before his wife and children survived, the wife and surviving children would have use during the wife’s lifetime (subject to her remaining unmarried), and the land would then go to Frank’s children if living.
- The 1882 deed further provided that if Frank died with no surviving children, title would be in the grantors.
- In 1897, after Frank’s wife had died, Lawrence Doyle executed a second deed to Frank purporting to convey the same land in fee simple and to remove the 1882 restrictions.
- In 1902, Frank Doyle and his (later) wife conveyed the land to John A. Stoller by warranty deed in fee simple.
- In prior litigation over Stoller’s attempted sale to a third party, the court had held the 1882 deed created an outstanding contingent interest in Frank’s children that the 1897 deed could not affect, making Stoller’s title unmerchantable.
- In 1909, Stoller filed an equity action to quiet title against Frank Doyle’s children, asserting Frank held only a life estate under the 1882 deed, the grantors retained a reversion, and the 1897 deed conveyed that reversion to Frank so it merged and eliminated the children’s intervening contingent remainders.
- The circuit court quieted title in Stoller; only the minor children, through a guardian ad litem, appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the 1882 deed conveyed Frank Doyle a fee with limitations over, or only a life estate with contingent remainders to his children and a reversion in the grantors.
2. Whether the 1897 deed could, by merger of interests, extinguish the future interests created for Frank Doyle’s children under the 1882 deed.
3. Whether Stoller was entitled to a decree quieting title in fee simple absolute against the children’s claims.

## Decision

- The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decree quieting title in Stoller.
- The court construed the 1882 deed as a conveyance of a fee to Frank Doyle with limitations over, not as a life estate followed by contingent remainders.
- Because the children’s interests arose as limitations on the fee, they were not contingent remainders subject to destruction by a later conveyance and merger.
- The 1897 deed could not divest or eliminate the children’s interests created by the 1882 deed.
- Stoller did not hold title in fee simple absolute free of the children’s future interests.

## Legal Principles

- A deed may convey a fee simple to the grantee while imposing express limitations over in favor of third parties upon stated contingencies.
- Future interests created as limitations over on a fee are not contingent remainders dependent on the natural termination of a particular estate.
- The doctrine of merger does not operate to destroy limitations over attached to a fee by treating them as intervening contingent remainders eliminated when a later-acquired interest is conveyed to the fee holder.
- A subsequent deed by the original grantor purporting to enlarge the grantee’s estate cannot defeat future interests previously created in favor of third parties by the earlier deed.

## Conclusion

The court held the 1882 conveyance gave Frank Doyle a fee subject to limitations over benefiting his children, and the later 1897 deed could not, through merger or otherwise, extinguish those future interests; therefore, Stoller was not entitled to have title quieted against the children.


Stoller v. Doyle, 257 Ill. 369, 100 N.E. 959 (Ill. 1913)