## Facts

- Richard and Audrey Stonecipher (buyers) entered a written contract to purchase Arnold and Elleen Pillatsch’s residence in Libertyville, Illinois, for $29,500.
- The Stoneciphers paid the Pillatsches a $1,000 earnest money deposit.
- The contract provided that possession would be delivered to the Stoneciphers on July 1, 1972.
- In late May or early June 1972, the Pillatsches contacted the Stoneciphers and asked to push back the possession date because their new home would not be ready.
- The Stoneciphers orally agreed to move the possession date to July 15, 1972, subject to approval by their landlord.
- Soon afterward, the Stoneciphers learned that the Pillatsches actually intended to remain in the house until August 1, 1972.
- The Stoneciphers then told the Pillatsches they would hold them to the original July 1 possession date.
- The Pillatsches responded that they could not move out until August 1.
- The Stoneciphers stated the contract was off and demanded return of the $1,000 deposit; the Pillatsches refused.
- On June 16, 1972, the Pillatsches’ attorney sent a letter stating the Pillatsches would vacate and give possession by July 1.
- The Stoneciphers did not respond to the letter and, on August 31, 1972, filed a small-claims action seeking return of the $1,000 deposit.
- After a bench trial, the circuit court entered judgment for the Stoneciphers, finding an anticipatory breach and ordering return of the deposit.
- The Pillatsches appealed, arguing there was no anticipatory breach, that the Stoneciphers failed to make an additional $3,000 payment required by the contract, and that the June 16 letter eliminated any earlier repudiation.

## Issues

1. Whether the sellers’ statements and conduct—insisting they would not deliver possession until August 1 after the buyers demanded July 1 possession—constituted an anticipatory repudiation of the contract.
2. Whether the buyers could treat the contract as terminated and recover their earnest money deposit without making further tenders, including an additional $3,000 payment claimed to be due under the contract.
3. Whether the sellers’ June 16 letter promising July 1 possession revoked any earlier repudiation after the buyers had already treated the contract as ended.

## Decision

- The Illinois Appellate Court (Second District) affirmed the judgment for the Stoneciphers.
- The court held that the Pillatsches’ insistence on remaining until August 1, in the face of the Stoneciphers’ demand for July 1 possession, supported the trial court’s finding of an anticipatory repudiation of a material term.
- Because the Stoneciphers elected to treat the repudiation as terminating the contract and demanded return of their deposit, they were excused from further performance.
- The Stoneciphers’ failure to tender the additional $3,000 payment did not bar recovery, because that obligation was discharged once the contract was treated as terminated due to the sellers’ repudiation.
- The June 16 letter offering timely performance did not defeat liability where the buyers had already accepted the repudiation by declaring the contract off and seeking return of the earnest money.

## Legal Principles

- An anticipatory repudiation occurs when, before performance is due, a party clearly and positively indicates that it will not or cannot perform a contractual duty when required.
- A refusal to perform a material term of a real-estate contract—such as the promised date of possession—can constitute anticipatory repudiation.
- Upon anticipatory repudiation, the non-breaching party may elect to treat the contract as terminated and sue immediately, rather than waiting until the time for performance.
- Once the non-breaching party elects termination based on repudiation, the non-breaching party’s remaining duties (including future payments) are discharged.
- A repudiating party may be able to retract repudiation only before the other side accepts it; after acceptance and election to treat the contract as ended, a later offer to perform does not restore the contract.
- In a rescinded real-estate sale following anticipatory repudiation, the buyer may recover an earnest money deposit as restitution.

## Conclusion

Stonecipher v. Pillatsch held that sellers who insisted they could not deliver possession on the contract date and instead demanded extra time committed an anticipatory repudiation; when the buyers treated that repudiation as ending the deal and sought return of their $1,000 earnest money, they were excused from further performance (including an additional payment), and the sellers’ later letter promising timely possession did not undo the already-accepted repudiation.


Stonecipher v. Pillatsch, 332 N.E.2d 151 (1975)